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Is equality a value? And if it is, can it be the only value in a moral theory? In addressing these two questions, this paper starts from the analysis of arguments wielded by Martin Farrell in Ethics in Domestic and International Relations that are intended to first show that equality —unlike happiness— is an opaque value while the latter is an intrinsic value. The opacity of equality, and not its merely instrumental nature, would be the cause that would prevent it from being the only value recognized in a moral theory. In addition to questioning both arguments, Hugo Omar Seleme proposes here that the notion of opacity must be refined for the purpose of correcting the weaknesses in Farrell’s second argument and, moreover, of exposing the error in the first one. Seleme holds that both equality and happiness have the same type of valuational opacity, a monism of happiness would be as implausible as one of equality.