This essay provides a global interpretation of the theoretical model presented by Aristotle in his work entitled Physics, particularly of the peculiar thematic and methodic design. Aristotle’s approach to natural processes and objects is described as a phenomenological access, quite opposite to what a predominantly causal-reductive focus would have been. This phenomenological access aims fundamentally at a dimension of manifestation and experience that is prior to any categorical distinction between what in modern times is called the "subject" and the "object" of knowledge. Upon this base, the author defends the theory that the obsolescence of most of the aspects that would today belong to what is called the empirical science of nature does not automatically entail a parallel obsolescence of the Aristotelian conception in the field of philosophical reflection. On the contrary, read fundamentally as a phenomenology of the experience of nature, situated methodically as a description corresponding to access inherent to a pre-reflexive attitude, the conception elaborated by Aristotle still nowadays surprisingly possesses, from a strictly philosophical viewpoint, a notable capacity of questioning.