The aim of this essay is to show the range of criticisms that have addressed Rawls’ work on justice from a feminist perspective. In many respects, Nussbaum argues, Rawls’s theory can be adapted to meet the most serious criticisms feminists have made against it. Objections based upon issues about emotion and affiliation are, by and large, met already by the theory in its current form or could be met by relatively minor adjustments. Criticisms based on the pervasiveness of unequal need and dependency, although they cut deeper, could be overcome fully by making modifications both in his account of citizens as fully cooperating members of society over a complete life and also in his account of primary goods. According to Nussbaum, the criticisms pertaining to the family raise, however, the most difficult and troubling issues because liberal justice is committed both to protecting spheres of personal definition and to ending the arbitrary and wrongful tyranny of some people over others. Then, it is no accident that the project of political liberalism should encounter difficulties in this sphere (the family) that is the home both of intimate self-definition and also of egregious wrongdoing. But the solution to these difficulties, Nussbaum argues, lies not in the rejection of Rawlsian liberalism but in a deeper and more extensive reflection about alternative liberal principles for its resolution.