Ten criticizes Raz’s definition of tolerance as a perfectionist principle. To that purpose he distinguishes two levels at which the ideal of autonomy operates: the level of different forms of life, and the level of politics. When considering autonomy as a regulative principle in individual lives, Ten rejects Raz’s theses that it requires competitive moral pluralism, and that different forms of life incorporate different virtues such that no one form of life can be better than another. These theses, says Ten, make Raz’s version of the principle of tolerance inapplicable to such matters as religion and sexuality. According to Ten, the very fact of choosing a particular form of life is in itself an ingredient of every good life, and it is for that reason that we must be tolerant of each form of life. Tolerance is therefore a neutral principal and anti-perfectionist. When, however, considered at the political level, the ideal of autonomy implies the acceptance of a particular political morality that is expressed in the damage principle; still, this does not require embracing perfectionism.