STUDY

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS AND ANALYSES OF THE UNIDAD POPULAR GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY COUP IN CHILE

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This study analyses Soviet perceptions of the actions of the Unidad Popular government and the military coup, based on documents from the ex-USSR and testimonies gathered in interviews. At the same time there is an examination of the evaluation made in the USSR as to the causes of the defeat of the Unidad Popular (UP) and the support later given by the USSR to the Chilean Communist and Socialist parties in their “popular rebellion” against the military regime.

The documents emphasise the question marks which, from the arrival of Salvador Allende to power, arose in the USSR about this first attempt of the materialisation of the Soviet hypothesis of a “peaceful road” to revolution. On the other hand, they also make clear the close, constant and profound relationship of the Communist party of the Soviet Union with its Chilean counterpart. After the fall of Salvador Allende, the experience of the Unidad Popular, perceived in the USSR as a process led by a “brother party” and developed along the lines of its own ideology, acquired a special importance for the Soviet authorities, particularly on account of their ideological debate with Euro communism. The Soviet analysis of the causes of

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the defeat of the Unidad Popular, centred on the idea that “the revolution must know how to defend itself”, although it recognised the inability of the Unidad Popular to gain the support of the majority of the Chilean population for its programme, considered it of vital importance the fact that the UP was not capable of breaking “the bourgeois state” and defend its project with arms. The reading of the Chilean Communist Party of the Soviet interpretation of the defeat of the UP served as an ideological reinforcement for its swing towards the idea of “popular revolution” and “all types of struggle”. Soviet support for the new political line of the Chilean Communist party showed itself, among other things, in the preparation of “military cadres” of the Communist Party. The appendices to this study include resolutions of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party regarding the military training of cadres from the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties in the USSR.

1. INTRODUCTION

Was the Unidad Popular government a moderate anti-imperialist one, nearer to the ideals expressed in Social-Democratic Europe ?. Did its principal leaders aspire to a model of “Democratic-Socialism”, as the Euro-communists formulated in the years following the Chilean coup ?. Or are we talking about a project whose ultimate aim was the radical transformation of a state based on property and its political structure, its social organisation and its international orientation, and taking its inspiration from “those Socialist states that actually exist”, the Soviet model for some and the Cuban for others ?.

In the international context of the era- the bipolar world of the Cold War - this political process, essentially Chilean and acted out by Chilean actors, acquired at the same time dimensions of an indirect, but significantly profound, confrontation of the Cold War. We believe that a study of the ideological leanings of its key actors, as well as the perception that their international counterparts had of them and the process, can help us to partly answer these complex questions.

The objective of this study is to analyse how the government of Salvador Allende was perceived in the Soviet Union and what was the Soviet political and theoretical evaluation afterwards of the defeat of the “Chilean way to Socialism”, and concluding with the reading that the Chilean Communist Party made of this evaluation. The study is based mainly on documents from the archives of the Central Committee (CC) of the Com-
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as on analytical documents of a “restricted nature” which reflect what the academic institutions in the USSR make of the Chilean process. These documents are complemented by reports (also restricted) written by Soviet functionaries on their return from “service commissions” in Chile during those years, several of which give eye witness accounts of the Chilean situation during the last months of the UP government and the coup itself. At the same time there are interviews with ex-Soviet functionaries who were close to what was happening in Chile then, and who either were present during the coup itself in the Embassy of the USSR in Santiago or who had participated in the articulation of Soviet policy towards Chile via the various institutions that represented Soviet exterior policy (the names of those interviewed can be found in References, at the end of the study, pages 170-171).

1.1 The “peaceful road towards a socialist revolution” in the arsenal of Soviet ideology

The formula of a “peaceful road to revolution” was incorporated for the first time in speeches of the Marxist Left at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. Prior to this, from Marx and the Russian Revolution onwards, the concept of a Socialist revolution was necessarily associated with violence, preferably via an uprising of the proletariat or a peasant campaign of guerrilla warfare, in the least advanced countries. In the USSR, the idea of a “peaceful way” obeyed the need to adapt doctrine to the changes that had happened in the middle of the 20th century in the world and especially in Europe. The removal of crises which could provoke this type of violent uprising in the developed countries of the West, together with the radical change in world equilibrium due to the inauguration of the nuclear era, obliged the Soviet leadership to look for different formulae which would allow it to reach accommodation with the new international situation and the internal state of Western countries, without explicitly renouncing the teleological objective which was the foundation of its raison d’être.

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1 The documents referred to regarding Soviet-Chilean relations, at State level and those from the non-State actors, as well as the Soviet perception of Chile during those years, rescued by O. Ulianova and E. Fediaikova from the archives of the ex-USSR, and translated into Spanish with comments, can be found in the Serie de Antecedentes, Nos.33, 34 and 35 of the Centro de Estudios Publicos. Among the documents quoted in this study, several are included in the Appendices and several were published in Estudios Publicos, 72 (1998), and this will be pointed out each time.
d’etre: the substitution of capitalism for socialism on a planetary scale. So the response to these new challenges was found in the formula of a “peaceful road to socialist revolution”, supposedly possible in the developed countries of the West, according to Kruschev, thanks to the existence of “large sectors of society” in favour of changes of direction towards socialism and of the reduced possibilities of “external counter-revolutionary intervention”, which was due to nuclear parity between the super powers. By incorporating the slogan “a peaceful road” into its programmes, the Communist Parties of the West did not appear to their national political systems to be forces which would sponsor the overthrow of the system and the idea of armed struggle.

The level of innovation which the “peaceful road” strategy introduced into the international Communist movement can be understood in the context of the so-called Kruschev “thaw”. At the 20th Congress in 1956 Kruschev had denounced the crimes of Stalin, albeit only partially and attributing them to the “cult of personality”, without in the least questioning the economic and social system which had been constructed in the USSR. In the same way “the peaceful road” idea, for its creators, only meant a different way to achieve socialism, influencing the time scales and the stages, but in no way modifying the model of society it was trying to construct. In effect, hand in hand with the introduction of the slogan “the peaceful road” went at the same time the concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in the programme of the CPSU and all the Communist Parties under its leadership.

1.2 Soviet Policy towards Latin America (1960-1970)

Aside from those Latin American Communist parties which adhered to the Comintern, the mythical image of a Soviet Russia seen in black or white and the beginnings of trade with Latin America between the 1920’s and the 1950’s, it was only after the Cuban Revolution that for the first time the USSR formulated specific policies related to the region. On the one hand, within the logic of the state interests of the USSR, centred at this time on the Cold War with the United States, Latin America could be seen as a possible area for competition. On the other, from an ideological perspective, the triumph of the Cuban revolution placed Latin America as a field where “socialist revolutions” were feasible, which permitted the USSR to keep that doctrine alive at the very moment when possibilities for it in the more developed countries seemed far away. In both, this commencement of Soviet Policy towards Latin America was part of an increase in Soviet activity in
the 3rd World during the time of Kruschev. The creation of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences and the beginnings of specialisation in Latin American studies in the Faculties of History and Economics at the Lomonsov University in Moscow can be interpreted as an expression of this growing Soviet interest, which led, at the same time, to an increase in the number of Communist parties which regularly received Soviet financial aid. The amounts of the aid also increased.

Towards the middle of the Sixties, when the “volunteerism” of Kruschev was followed by so-called “stagnation” under Brezhnev, subtle differences appeared in the Soviet policy towards Latin America. Without renouncing the idea of the “revolutionary perspective”, in this new stage of the Cold War the USSR concentrated its strategy on supporting those “anti-imperialist” governments”, both civilian and military, which flourished in Latin America at that time. Together with the understandable desire to assure itself of allies without the need to assume the economic commitments of a “new Cuba”, we can see reflections in this strategy of the perception of Latin America as part of the 3rd World, for which “national liberation movements” and/or “anti-imperialist” ones of the Nasser type could be the most appropriate road to its incorporation into the “world revolutionary process”. In fact this line taken by Soviet policy overseas can be seen in the great interest shown in the military regimes of the “nationalist Left” on the continent like those of Velasco Alvarado in Peru and Juan Jose Torres in Bolivia. This can be demonstrated in the privileged attention they received, by lending them the Soviet Secret services,3 and by support which was expressed in political and diplomatic gestures, economic conventions and, in the case of Peru, armaments. It is worth pointing out that these “anti-imperialist” regimes were not considered as alternatives but as allies in the experiment of real socialism in the region, best personified in Cuba.

As for Chile, the country appears in Soviet analyses of the Sixties as an exception in the Latin American context, for the “European” character of its political system, and, especially, for the level of organisation and political weight of its “working class”, which was reflected in the influence the Chilean Communist Party exerted on national policy and on the main Chilean union, the Central Unica de Trabajadores (the CUT), which was led at

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2 Numerous studies talk about the “anti-imperialist” potential of the Latin American military. See, for example, A. Shulgovski “The Army and Politics in Latin America” (1979).

3 General N. Leonov, of the KGB, was sent to Peru as soon as the movement led by Velasco Alvarado took power in 1968; Leonov also maintained a strong personal friendship with General Omar Torrijos, who became President of Panama in 1972 (see N. Leonov “Soviet Intelligence in Latin America during the Cold War”, Estudios Publicos, 73 (1999), pages 37 and 38).
this time by Communists. If Soviet ideological doctrine of the 60’s took into consideration three “driving forces” behind the process of world revolution - “the socialist countries”, “the working class of the capitalist countries” and the “movements of national liberation in the countries on the road to development” - the revolutionary perspectives of the majority of the countries of the region were linked to the third (the “movements of national liberation”), but the Chilean perspective was associated with the second (“the working class”).

The perception of Chile as a country where it would be feasible to carry out a “classic revolution”, led by the working class, gave birth to a special relationship between the CPSU (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the Chilean Communist Party. As a result, the contacts between the two intensified during the 60’s, as did co-operation between the Soviet unions and the CUT. For the Soviets, the CUT was an important partner: in those days Chile was the only Western country where the main union was controlled by Communists. A clear manifestation of the importance assigned to the Chilean CP (Communist Party) is reflected in the level at which were their delegates were received in the USSR, as well as the presence of members of the Politburo in the Soviet delegations which attended the congresses of their “brother party”.

Unlike Cuba, which promoted armed insurrection and encouraged the forces of the Left throughout Latin America in this direction, the USSR pushed the Communist parties of the region towards a “gradualist” strategy. In the case of Chile, the strategy of the “peaceful road” of the Chilean CP was constantly supported and encouraged by its Soviet counterpart. The documents of the period reflect an implicit recognition of the identity of the positions of the CPSU and the Chilean CP in ideological themes which worried the Soviet leadership. The conversations between the Soviet embassy in Santiago (diplomatic relations had been restored in 1964) and the Chilean Communist leaders show a closeness and affinity of comrades from the same ranks. At the same time, the correspondence between the Chilean Communist union leaders and officials from their Soviet counterparts include reports about the internal situation in Chile, elaborated in the best Comintern style and written in a doctrinal language which supposes a completely identical interpretation of each one of the ideological concepts used in them.

4 On the support from Havana for “the armed way” and its ties with the Chilean Socialist Party, see Cristian Perez “Salvador Allende: Some Notes on his Security Team”, Estudios Publicos, 79 (2000). As to the affinity and closeness of the Chilean Communist Party with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, see the documents in “Serie de Antecedentes”, Numbers 34 and 35, Centro de Estudios Publicos.
The Chilean CP, the nearest to the Soviet position in its dispute with Cuba - to the point where its leaders were considered in the region as mere Soviet spokesmen on the theme - but also the one with the greatest influence over the workers in its country and the most political presence in its national political system, received the most significant contributions from the CPSU of all Latin American Communist parties. Thus the material aid from the CPSU to the Chilean CP, which was constant from 1960, increased from 50,000 dollars that year to 400,000 dollars by the year 1970 and reached 645,000 dollars by 1973, the end of the Allende period (in the dollar equivalent of that year). 5

The deep and influential relationship between the two parties, the CPSU and the Chilean PC, would be an important factor in the USSR’s perception of the Unidad Popular and their evaluation of its collapse, as well as for an understanding of the expectations that the Chilean Left had formed with regards to the size of the help they would receive from the USSR if their revolutionary project materialised.

2. SOVIET FOLLOWING OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNIDAD POPULAR GOVERNMENT: “THIS IS NOT GOING TO END WELL.....”

2.1 The Triumph of the Unidad Popular in 1970

If the “Chilean road to socialism”, in its theoretical and international legitimacy, was the daughter of Kruschev’s formula “the peaceful road to socialist revolution”, its delivery was rather polemical for its ideological progenitors. The eventual triumph of the Unidad Popular in the elections was seen in the ideology of the USSR at that time as showing how it was possible that the “peaceful road”, which existed previously as a slogan, could materialise. On the other hand it was one of the few revolutionary processes with a possibility of success: among its leaders was a Communist Party which enjoyed old and profound relations with Moscow and whose orthodoxy was not in doubt. As has been mentioned in the previous section, the guarantees of this Soviet perception were based on the full identification of the Chilean Communist Party with Soviet ideology. At the same time, the Chilean CP was seen in Moscow as a “creative” Communist Party,

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5 Regarding the material aid given to Chilean communism from the Soviet Union during these years, see O. Ulianova and E. Fediakova “Some Aspects of the Financial Aid from the Communist Party of the USSR to Chilean Communism during the Cold War” (1998), Also see the documents in “Chile in the Archives of the USSR”, Estudios Publicos, 72 (1998).
which had managed to adapt to national conditions and which knew the most appropriate way to act politically in those conditions, albeit taking an absolutely orthodox political line.⁶

To those people we interviewed, the triumph of Allende in the 1970 elections, although desired and hoped for, took Soviet foreign policy by surprise,⁷ which confirms the hypothesis expressed by Joaquin Fermandois in the 80’s,⁸ when Western researchers still had no access to Soviet documents and eye witness accounts regarding the event. There are indirect documentary testimonies to this surprise. The report of the Soviet delegation which attended the transfer of power in Chile in November 1970 demonstrates this idea, without refuting it, by quoting Luis Corvalan, who reproached his “Soviet colleagues” for not having believed in the triumph of Allende, and for therefore not having actual projects of economic cooperation with the new Chilean regime.⁹ In fact it was only after Allende’s triumph that Soviet analysts, dedicated to Latin American themes, began an analysis of the UP as far as its political and economic viability was concerned. And, while the Soviet press did not lack for epithets referring to the glorious triumph of the “Chilean revolutionary forces”, Soviet bureaucracy only recently was beginning to move itself.

From the beginning the hopes of seeing such a singular project materialise, were mixed with the fear of creating false expectations. Thus, on the eve of the Presidential election of 1970, while the Soviet press was publishing optimistic opinions from the Chilean Communist leaders¹⁰, the Soviet ambassador in Santiago was consulting with his diplomatic staff,¹¹ and the relevant authorities in Moscow were having to take decisions, among them the International Department of the CPSU, no one dared to project the scenario of a possible triumph for Allende.¹² Later on, several people from the official Soviet delegation present at the change of Government in November 1970 expressed their opinion that “this is not going to end well....”¹³ Is it possible that distrust of the unknown was being expres-

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⁶ Interview with K. Brutenz, Moscow, 1999
⁷ Interviews with Y. Rybalkin, V. Kazakov, K. Brutenz, A. Stroganov and A. Sosnovski, Moscow, 1997-1999
¹⁰ See for example, Pravda, September 2nd, 1970.
¹¹ Interview with V. Kazakov, Moscow, 1998.
¹² Interview with Y. Rybalkin, Moscow, August 1997.
¹³ Ibid.
sed in these opinions as the “peaceful road” had not been practised anywhere, or does it mark the start of distrust in the doctrine itself?.

The analytical documents of those times are very cautious. In a voluminous report on the perspectives of economic relations between the USSR and Chile, prepared by V. Nikitin on behalf of the Soviet Committee for Overseas Economic Links, finished at the end of 1970, it speaks of the political background at the end of the 60’s as regards these relations, and, in spite of concluding the report after Allende´s triumph in the elections, does not visualise a “revolutionary” government as part of the scenario, with which relations would be different. The moderate tone of this report can be interpreted as a demonstration of inertia (supposing that the report simply ended before the elections of 1970, plus taking into consideration the perspectives of effective co-operation in whatever the political context might be and supposing it was not revised afterwards) or of an implicit distrust that Allende could maintain power and carry out his proposed reforms.

There was also a cautious note in the correspondence between the Soviet unions and their Chilean counterparts. Although there were a lot of messages exchanged between September and November 1970, relating principally to the transfer of scholarships to institutions of higher education and to Soviet union schools and to the regular invitation of a delegation of the CUT for the 7th of November (the anniversary of the Revolution) to the USSR, nothing is mentioned in these documents as to the political change which was happening in Chile at this time. Nor did the exchange of diplomatic greetings in the 1971 New Year include any modification as to previous years or any allusion to the “government of the workers”.

However, we must remember that behind the Unidad Popular and its programme was also the “brother party” of the USSR whose loyalty and doctrinal strength did not arouse doubts. And so the officially quoted report of the Soviet delegation to the handover of power was optimistic, pointing out that the Unidad Popular government could count on the “full and decided support of the workers, of the majority of the political parties and of the Armed Forces. The magnitude and character of this support will

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14 V. Nikitin “Perspectives regarding Economic Cooperation with the Republic of Chile”, report on behalf of the Soviet Committee for Overseas Economic Links (1970), archive of the Institute of Latin America in the Russian Academy of Sciences. The report is a strictly technical one, which presents the state of the Chilean economy at that time, Chilean exports and imports, its principal trading partners and the condition of its overseas trade. Everything is based on official Chilean documentation and specialist overseas sources. On the basis of these the report indicates possible areas where economic co-operation could begin.
create the conditions necessary to achieve the objectives established in the
programme of the Unidad Popular”.\textsuperscript{15} The suggestions behind this report,
signed by high officials from the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, went
a long way to speeding up the drawing up of programmes for economic co-
operation.

As we shall see in the following sections, apart from the reports
which emphasised the “peculiarities” of the Unidad Popular government
headed by President Allende, Soviet publications, including those of the
press, openly presented the programmes of the government as being under-
taken “under the direction of the Communist Party”. And, beside detailed
analysis of the programme of the UP, its application to the concept of
revolution” and its different stages and sub-stages, internal propaganda
and Soviet Communist sensitivity saw the Chilean process as a revolution
coming from the same tree as the Russian one.

2.2 Soviet analysis of the Unidad Popular in power

2.2.1 Ideological and propagandist interpretation

From the ideological point of view, the problem centres on the “cha-
racter” of the Chilean revolution and the classification of the Unidad Popu-
lar regime in one of the following categories for States: “socialist countries”,
“countries with a socialist orientation” (these are labelled with or without
“the party in the vanguard”), “progressive anti-imperialist countries” and
so on until one arrives at the categories “capitalist” and “imperialist”.\textsuperscript{16}

In February 1971, Chile was given a separate mention in Brezhnev’s
speech to the XXIV Congress of the CPSU\textsuperscript{17} in the sense of being an
example of the advance of “progressive forces” in the world. The word
“revolution” was not used: Chile was only a part of the “revolutionary

\textsuperscript{15} Dzotsenideze and Zhukov “Report from the Soviet Delegation”, reproduced
in “Chile in the Archives of the USSR”, Estudios Publicos, 72 (1998), page 414.

\textsuperscript{16} In accordance with the categories which were decided by the USSR with those
States in a process of change, people were named with a pre-determined profile in
specific institutions, resources were given to each one of the Soviet organisms in charge
of political and economic activity, and a specific ideological language was constructed
for the regime in question. In this sense the ritualistic Soviet protocol was very rigid -
from the use of the concepts of “comrade” and/or “Mister”, passing through wreaths at
the tomb of Lenin up to mentions of speeches as to the future of Communism in the
world, the role of the USSR and the concrete steps taken in her foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{17} See the Communist Party of the Soviet Union “Documents of the 24th
Congress” (1971).
process”. The first reference to the UP government in terms which referred to it as a regime of “socialist orientation”, appears in Soviet congratulations to the CUT on the May 1st celebrations of 1971.

As to the Chilean process and the idea of a “peaceful road to socialism”, in an article of 1971, written by M. Kudachkin, head of the Latin American section of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the “leading role” of the Chilean CP in the triumph of the UP is emphasised, a signal that we are dealing with a trustworthy regime. The successes of the CP in achieving “unity” are praised and it goes on to indicate that the Chilean CP supports the idea of a “peaceful road”, managing to triumph in Presidential elections not Parliamentary ones, as one would suppose from the first descriptions of this strategy, and pointing out that it could be that an alliance “under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party” could play the role of the vanguard in the “revolutionary process” (the word “revolution” was still prohibited). Nevertheless, in no way was it doubted that this process, under the direction of a Marxist-Leninist Party, with all its “peculiarities”, and with its peaceful characteristics, would finally manage to arrive at the unique model of society known in the Soviet Union as “socialism” and which stemmed from the Soviet model. This implies a major commitment and ideological identification of the CPSU with the Chilean process as regards the real possibilities of the USSR giving Chile an economic lifeboat. This ideological perception of the Chilean process is also reflected in political measures, such as the naming of V. Basov as the Soviet Ambassador in Chile, replacing a career diplomat. The nomination of V. Basov, a functionary of the CPSU with “great party experience”, confirms the supposition that the “brother party” might need his assistance in this area.

Later on, in January 1972, during celebrations for the 50th anniversary of the Chilean CP, the CPSU not only supported its Chilean ally but also used the opportunity to show the world that the process which was developing in Chile was part of the advance of the “International Commu-

18 M. Kudachkin “The Communist Party of Chile in the Fight for Unity and the Victory of the Popular Anti-Imperialist Forces” (1971). This article was published in a strictly doctrinaire magazine called “Problems of the History of the CPSU”, where each word had to express the official position. The fact that an article about Chile appeared in this magazine shows that there was already a commencement in the elaboration of an “official history of the Chilean revolution” for the consumption of the world Communist movement. The same author edited another book about Chile at the same time: “The Communist Party of Chile and the Fight for Revolution” (1972) and in 1973 did his doctoral thesis on a Chilean theme: “Chile: the Fight for Unity and the Victory of the Forces of the Left” (1973).

19 Interview with V. Kaxakov, Moscow, 1998.
nist movement”. The Soviets sent a member of the Politburo who was especially close to Brezhnev to the celebrations in Santiago, a fact which was much appreciated by the Chilean communists: a series of articles by leading Chilean communists also appeared in the Soviet press and a special session was organised in Moscow with the Academy of Sciences and other major ideological Institutes like the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the CPSU with the idea of celebrating the 50 years of the Chilean Communist Party. Inaugurating the session, the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, P.N. Fedoseev, defined its objectives as “analysing the historical experience and the important results of the fruitful activity of the Communist Party of Chile, which has made such great creative support to the world revolutionary process, and to the treasure which is Marxism-Leninism”.

Very few of the world’s Communist Parties managed to have celebrations of their anniversaries of this magnitude in Moscow. The celebration was, at the same time, a form of ideological appropriation of the Unidad Popular experiment. Many of the contributions to the session began with the words that “the triumph of democratic revolution in Chile is, in the first place, the triumph of the Chilean working class, led by the Communist Party” and went on to distinguish the numerous achievements of the Chilean CP. The eulogies concentrated on the recent past and made no attempt to discuss the perspectives of the survival of the process.

The idea of the affinity of the Chilean revolutionary process to the origins of the Russian Revolution, in spite of differences in the ways it was being carried out, was also the central theme of Soviet propaganda about Chile. In this area, apart from the presence of various volumes of reportage, the key work about Chile was to be found in cinema documentary. This was an excellent full length film, filmed in Chile at the beginning of the 70’s by the most relevant Soviet documentary film maker of the period, Roman Carmen, which converted Chile into a palpable symbol of the Soviet political image.

Its objective was not to analyse the viability of the programmes or internal problems. Allende’s Chile was presented as a “true revolution”, heir to the Soviet October, in spite of the differences, and which generated an authentic revolutionary mystique amongst its participants.

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21 Ibid, page 207.
22 It must be remembered that Soviet cinematic production was not plentiful and full length documentaries dedicated to external events have been very few in all the history of the Soviet cinema.
2.2.2 Doubts about the viability of the process: confidential reports and analyses.

Despite the applause, the praise and the public celebrations, over the three years of Allende’s government, confidential Soviet diplomatic analyses and reports about the Chilean reality, implicitly and explicitly, revolved around the theme of the viability and reversibility of the process, as well as the possibility of its interruption from a military coup. The common denominator of all was uncertainty.

The first reports were moderately optimistic and hopeful. In October 1970, a report from the Soviet Embassy in Santiago began by saying that “the consolidation of the victory... is not an automatic process” (a subtle allusion to the possibility of a reverse), went on to underline the advances made in the rapprochement of the UP with the DC (the Christian Democrat Party), and ended by emphasising the importance of prolonging and strengthening the tendencies for an alliance with the DC.23

At the same time, Volodia Teitelboim was informing the Soviet ambassador about the contacts which the leaders of the UP had made with the Armed Forces, assuring him that they had a benevolent attitude towards the new government. This optimistic and “constructive” vision of the situation was sent back to Moscow again by the Soviet Embassy in December 1970, together with a vision of the Chilean CP handed over to the Soviets by Orlando Millas.24 In 1971, on the basis of these perceptions, the USSR began to draw up and apply policies of economic co-operation with Chile. The list of the visits that were carried out and the agreements that were signed are found in Chilean works which deal with the theme.25 A revision of the list allows us to conclude that that the agreements which the Soviet Union signed and began to carry out in Chile at that time were limited to promoting machinery and Soviet technology for inter-governmental development projects which could be continued even if the “anti-imperialist” project were reversed. At the end of 1971 criticisms began to appear about the internal situation in Chile from the Soviet embassy in Santiago. This time they contained opinions expressed by leaders of the Socialist Party in a

meeting with the Soviet ambassador in Chile, A.V. Basov. The report of the meeting starts off confirming that, in the judgement of these leaders, “the political situation in the country is not favourable for the forces of the Left or for the government of the Unidad Popular and that this situation means that there has been too slow an advance in the revolutionary process”....and that therefore they feel it was necessary “to reactivate this revolutionary process”. The diplomatic report reproduces these opinions without any comments underlining the key concepts of this observation in italics.

For the whole of 1972 we have at our disposal a full and detailed report of the internal situation in Chile, the government and perspectives about its relations with the USSR. It was drawn up by a group of researchers from the Institute of Latin America after their stay in Chile and on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It is probable that the report was requested as preparation for the official visit of President Allende to the USSR in December 1972.

The document is crucial for analysing the Soviet perspective of Chile on the eve of this visit. Throughout the text the word “revolution” is studiously avoided. There is also no talk of a “socialist orientated” government. On the other hand the first few lines talk about “the bloc of revolutionary forces” having as the ultimate objective of their programme, “the beginning of the construction of socialism in Chile”. Nevertheless it immediately afterwards goes on to say that “the methods for reaching this objective are still not clear” This sentence indicates that, according to the authors, socialism in Chile was still a distant objective, and that the ways to advance this process were still not predetermined, accepting in the text the possibility of a return to the more traditional road of armed revolution, which had never been admitted in the open Soviet publications of the era.

As the first “peculiarity” of the internal Chilean political situation, it points out the non-resolution of the problem of power, which “is not going to be resolved shortly either”. It adds that according to Lenin, “the key problem of every revolution is the problem of power”. From this affirmation we can surmise that there was still no revolution in Chile and the power of

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26 It needs to be pointed out that this one of the first interparty contacts between the Socialist Party of Chile and the Communist Party of the USSR (before 1970 only the Chilean PC had relations with the CPSU at this level).
the UP was not considered that strong. On the other hand the non resolution of the problem of power indicates, at the same time, that the report was not expecting a violent interruption of the process. Later on, the same document explicitly rejects the possibility of a military coup before the March 1973 elections (which is presumably what those who commissioned the report wanted to read).29 Certainly the authors of the report are talking of the short term and the same confirmation of the lack of probability of a coup before a predetermined date can be interpreted as being more probable after it.

“Constitutional guarantees” signed by Allende are also mentioned. Although this paragraph does not contain any value judgements, this “peculiarity” of the Chilean process is interpreted as being an obstacle to the development of the revolution, as it implies the ideas of “keeping the absolute liberty of the press, respecting the rights of the Opposition and staying faithful to the Constitution. In practice, this means a promise to conserve all the democratic-bourgeois institutions.... that is to say, to reject the revolutionary breaking down of the old State apparatus, including the Army, the Security Services etc.”30 It is important to emphasise that it was precisely this “breaking down” which formed the central part of the definition of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in Soviet Marxism.

The process of political management was also considered to be defective. Multipartyism was seen as a difficulty, pointing out the lack of doctrinaire heterogeneity of the block and the depth of discrepancies that existed between Communists and Socialists. “Between the Communists and the Socialists differences and contradictions exist in such important problem areas as Agriculture, the attitude towards the groups of the extreme Left and the relations with the Right, among others.”31 Although it underlines the support given by the CUT to the government and its strength among the country’s workers, it also warns of a growing “economism” in the Chilean unions, which can be interpreted as a lack of confidence in this social base for carrying out the political process.32

The report warned that the political situation was extremely tense and polarised. On the one hand it pointed out the reduction in the social

29 Ibid, pages 432 and 436.
32 Ibid, page 425. It should be noted that the organs of Soviet security and the political analysts followed the mood of the workers and also their possible actions against regimes of the “socialist camp” or of “socialist orientation”. Although this was never recognised publicly, the fear was that these movements could undermine these regimes as well as the doctrines upon which they were based. The ideological explanation of the time was “lack of class consciousness” and “economism”, (valid for East Germany at the end of the 4o’s and for Poland during the years 1970-1980). It is no coincidence that various of the documents quoted mention strikes in the copper mines.
base of the government which was shown in the local elections of 1971-1972: on the other it emphasised the substitution of the three thirds which had dominated Chilean politics for decades (the Left, the Centre and the Right) for a bipolar model, in which Allende’s government faced a united opposition. It went on to talk about the increasing presence of extremist groups “Patria y Libertad” (Land and Liberty) on one side and the MIR on the other, and predicted a growth in their activities in the near future. Special attention was given to the MIR, by remarking that “the links of the Unidad Popular to the MIR are closer and more complicated than they appear at first”. The report also mentions the special relationship between the MIR and the PS (Socialist Party), in particular with Carlos Altamirano, its counterintelligence function for the UP and the presence of “close relatives” of Allende in the MIR leadership. According to the authors of the report, Allende “wanted to put the organisation under his control rather than weaken or destroy it”, with the idea of pitting it against the extreme Right.

The report underlines the recent tendency of Allende’s government for incorporating representatives of the military into his cabinet so as to resolve “political and social problems”. For the authors this was a signal that “Allende had no intention of resolving or could not resolve social problems relying solely on the support of union leadership.....nor could he solve the political problems by relying solely on the support of the parties in the Unidad Popular”. In other words they did not exclude the possibility of Allende turning to the military to solve the problems in carrying out the process. The report once again emphasises the constitutionalist traditions of the Armed Forces and the influence of the Left in them, through men of trust, which is presented as a decisive factor in the improbability of a coup d’etat in the short term. Nevertheless, it warns that the attempts of the government to involve the military in politics could awaken their appetites for power and give them experience in running the State.

Despite all this, the final conclusions regarding the internal political situation in Chile point to a peaceful outcome of the existing crisis “The internal and external policies of the Allende regime are acquiring a more moderate and reformist character each time.....nevertheless it can be affirmed that in spite of tension and instability in the internal Chilean political situat-

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33 Ibid, page 429.
34 Ibid, page 429.
tion, Allende should manage to hold on to power and finish his Presidential term, i.e. until 1976”.

We believe that the key idea of this conclusion is centred on the evaluation that Allende could stay in power until the end of his term. Given the crisis situation, it would be moderation that would make it possible to avoid a coup. In the context of the description of the internal political crisis, the non-implementation of a socialist transformation is understood rather as a momentary impossibility and as the President’s option to overcome the crisis by not accelerating this transformation. One can also read in the report an implicit sympathy from the authors as to the position of Chilean Socialists who were pushing for an acceleration of the transformation process.

It must be recognised that after the collection of “great” contradictions presented in the report, the conclusion that the regime could possibly continue until 1976 does not appear to be quite so obvious and could be interpreted as being influenced by the good intentions of the authors towards Allende’s government, as well as by their anxiety in not being labelled “defeatists”.

It also bears a certain relation to the position of Chilean CP in this respect. According to the report, the Communists inside the UP were promoting the “idea of transforming the economy to its maximum extent before 1976, and therefore shutting the road behind them, independent of who would come to power in the new Presidential elections”. At the same time, it points out that “the Socialists (more than the other parties) hope to stay in power after 1976, but do not know how to do this”.

It is here that we encounter the problem of the reversability of the electoral process, inherent in the “peaceful road” idea as far as the democratic electoral process is concerned, but difficult to resolve in doctrinal terms for Soviet Marxism, since its ideology supposes that revolutionaries do not take power only to hand it back to the bourgeoisie. According to these ideological principles, such an outcome would be considered as the “defeat of the revolution”. The Russian Latin American expert, A.I. Stroganov, recalls that the theme was brought up in Moscow by Luis Corvalan who accepted the possibility that the UP might lose the 1976 elections. “We are going to prepare for the next elections” the Chilean Communist leader had declared. His gamble lay in the idea of making the economic transformations to be carried out by the UP so institutionalised that the new government

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37 Ibid, page 436
38 Ibid, page 430.
would not be able to undo them and would have to act within the framework designed by the previous one. This strategy, or rather the willingness to “leave Executive Power”, provoked perplexity in those in charge of the ideology of the CPSU, especially in M. Suslov, who was a member of the Politburo. Curiously enough, the Socialist insistence on not leaving power once it had been conquered coincided much more to the ideological position expressed by Suslov, in spite of all the accusations of ultra-Leftism which Soviet analysts made about the Chilean Socialist Party in classified documents. Whatever Suslov’s reaction, in the documents analysed there was no accusation of the Chilean CP being “revisionist” or “deviationist” at any time because of their position. Rather they took an expectant position. The doctrinaire loyalty of the Chilean Communist Party to Soviet Marxism put it outside any suspicion. As far as the perspectives of Soviet economic co-operation with Allende’s government go, the report, from the analysis of the political situation and the correlation of forces in Chile, recommends several areas of co-operation which could be continued even if there were a change of government. As they deal with proposals related to possible expenditure and assignment of resources on the part of the Soviet government, we believe that these precautions reflect its vision of the viability of Allende’s government: the substitution of this government for another is seen in the USSR as a very probable scenario, and despite this scenario they are still thinking of economic co-operation. Nevertheless they do not think that the change will be that drastic or affect economic co-operation with the USSR.

Analysing the perspectives of economic relations with Allende’s government, although the report starts by emphasising the distinct character and new volume of these relations after Allende’s coming to power, as well as the interest of the Chilean government in developing relations with Socialist countries, it sounds a cautious note by saying that “this government (i.e. the Unidad Popular) is characterised by its tendency to focus on this problem from the point of view of obtaining technical and financial economic aid from the USSR and other Socialist countries. The future development of economic relations with Chile would depend, in the first place, on decisions which have already been taken or which would be taken in the

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39 Interview with A.I. Stroganov, Moscow 1998. At the same time the ex-"Number 2" in the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, K. Brutenz, commented in an interview with us that “Suslov didn’t like Corvalan. He found him rather heterodox”. (Interview with K.B. Brutenz, Moscow 1999).
very near future with respect to this problem.\footnote{Institute for Latin America in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR “Report on the Situation”, reproduced in “Chile in the Archives of the USSR”, in Estudios Publicos, 72 (1998), page 438.} It recognises, however, that the report was being presented at exactly the time when the taking of decisions in the USSR should be resolved, as to what point they should be willing to commit themselves to this aid.

The document, carrying out a survey of bilateral economic relations in 1971 and the first half of 1972, presents Chilean expectations to the Soviet reader as exaggerated.\footnote{Ibid.} “The plan for the development of Soviet-Chilean trade proposed by the Chilean side implies that the Soviet Union will have to accept conditions which have never been contemplated before in the relations of the USSR with countries on the road to development. The Chileans are hoping that the USSR will supply them annually with large consignments of products of prime necessity, and which are also scarce in the Soviet Union, like wheat, meat, butter, cotton etc....on the basis of a long term credit. At the same time, they suppose that the Soviet Union will have import products that they do not have a great need for and pay them immediately in hard currency...”\footnote{Ibid, page 439.}

In passing, the report mentions that the credit conditions asked for by the Chileans contemplate the beginning of payment after 1976.\footnote{A.V. Basov “Conversation of Ambassador A.V.Basov with Luis Corvalan and Volodia Teitelboim, September 13th 1972”, reproduced in “Chile in the Archives of the USSR”, Estudios Publicos, 72, (1998), page 441.} “that is to say, by the following Chilean administration”\footnote{Ibid, page 441.}. In other words negotiations would have started from the supposition that a change of government would happen that year and the “subsequent administration” would have to take charge, so therefore it would be convenient to leave problems pending for it to solve.

However in a document from the Embassy in Santiago, dated September 13th 1972, the theme of a possible coup d’etat appears. The ambassador tells of Luis Corvalan’s warning of such a possibility. The situation is described in terms such as “price rises, supply problems...the disastrous behaviour of ultra-Left groups... links between these and the Chilean Socialist Party.....the military training of Socialists”, reaching the conclusion that there is an “abrupt fall in the prestige of the Allende government”.\footnote{Ibid.} The ambassador goes on to say “Corvalan emphasised the fact that with these conditions there exists a real danger of a coup d’etat”,\footnote{Ibid.} but at the same
time passes on the words of Volodia Teitelboim regarding the loyalty and constitutionalism of the Armed Forces, confirmed in meetings with their representatives.

All this background information was analysed by the Soviet authorities in preparation for Allende’s visit to the USSR at the end of 1972. According to K. Jachaturov, ex-Vice President of the Novosti Press Agency, it was then that the theme of the Chilean situation and Soviet aid for Allende’s government was discussed for the first time in the Politburo (which, in his opinion, showed that the USSR did not have a unique and well planned policy with respect to Chile, but a summary of policies from different Soviet institutions). According to Jachaturov, Soviet negativity at Chilean requests was partly due to the economic limitations of the USSR, but also, and maybe primarily, due to the evaluation of the UP project in Chile as being non-viable.45 It is possible that the “non-viability” of the project did not necessarily mean a coup in the short term, but the failure to carry out socialism in Chile and the substitution of the UP government in the next elections for whatever other “bourgeois” political force.

The same person also contends that those in charge of the “practical” side of the Soviet leadership, namely A. Kosygin, President of the Council of Ministers, and Yuri Anropov, who was President of the KGB, were very much against a new overseas economic commitment similar to the one in Cuba. While, on the other hand, the patriarchs of the ideological area (M. Suslov, P. Ponomariov and V. Kirilenko) showed themselves willing to “help and consolidate the revolution in Chile.”46 This testimony shows that in spite of the cautious predictions about the evolution of the Chilean process, an ideological willingness existed in the Soviet leadership for a greater involvement in Chile. In its way, it leads us to believe that, because of its economic incapability, the USSR did not want to take on the commitment of a “new Cuba”. But, at the same time, the impossibility of recognising the beginning of the economic eclipse of the USSR at that moment, would make the authors of the decision and those with a retentive memory in highest echelons of the ideological apparatus insist on the evaluation of the non-viability of the project as being the basis for their decision.

We do not have access to the records of this meeting of the Politburo: with the exception of those declassified in 1991, the documents remain inaccessible for a long time to come.

On the basis of those available, we consider that the information provided by the person we interviewed to be quite trustworthy, basically

46 Ibid.
because in the position he then held, he would have been informed about these type of decisions.

K. Jachaturov’s version is indirectly confirmed by the testimony of N. Leonov, who was then the Head of the Analytical Department of Soviet Overseas Intelligence (the KGB). The conclusions of the analysts of the KGB, according to Leonov, were conclusive and very pessimistic: they considered the end of the Allende government to be inevitable.\footnote{Leonov recounts in his memoirs about an evaluation of the Chilean situation demanded by the President of the KGB and member of the Politburo, A. Andropov - which was done, according to Leonov, at the beginning of 1973 - because of the need for taking a decision about whether to deliver economic aid to Allende’s government or not. See N. Leonov “Difficult Times” (1995), pages 125-126. Also N. Leonov “Soviet Intelligence in Latin America during the Cold War”, Estudios Publicos, 73, (1999), page 55.} Although the dates mentioned by Jachaturov and Leonov do not coincide (one talks about the end of 1972, the other about the beginning of 1973), this can be put down to a certain confusion due to the amount of time that has gone by, as well as the probability that the Chilean theme, discussed for the first time in the Politburo on the eve of Allende’s visit, came back on the agenda in 1973, thanks to new petitions for help from the Unidad Popular government.

Notwithstanding the pessimistic conclusions of the Soviet Secret Services and Soviet caution regarding the petitions for help from a friendly government, the mention of the possibility of a coup or any other interruption to the “revolutionary process in Chile” in academic and journalistic “open publications” in the USSR was completely absent. If “defeatism” was not allowed in official rhetoric in confidential reports, it was also banned with even more reason from the media.

2.2.3 The last months of Allende

Unfortunately there are no reports in existence, similar to the two above, which analyse the last period of Allende’s government. However, the evolution of the Soviet perception of the situation in Chile during those last months of the Undid Popular administration can be analysed through a series of documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a report of February 21st 1973 (see the complete text in Appendix A.1) the economic problems of Allende’s government are seen as the principal source of its instability. In language redolent of the economics of “social realism”, and
resorting to concepts which very well known in practice in the USSR, the economic crisis is characterised as “a crisis of supply failure”.48

So as not to appear like Cassandra, the author of the report (O. Grek) presents the information as a summary of opinions from the international press, which includes quotes from El Mercurio from leaders of the Chilean Communist Party. Nevertheless, the internal economic situation is still presented in concepts like “a shortage of foodstuffs”, “black market”, “lack of essential consumer goods” and “queues”.49

Protecting himself behind the shield of “information based on the foreign press”, the author of the report dares to postulate that “maybe the government of the Unidad Popular understood too late the danger which threatened the country as a result of the grave crisis of supply failure”.50 Starting with a deceptive picture of the economic crisis in the country, he goes on to foresee a drop in electoral support for the UP in the March parliamentary elections. The report seems to be an anticipated explanation of the UP’s eventual loss of power after these elections. Accepting this alternative as the most probable one, the report warns against a worsening of the political situation in Chile after the elections. “The President himself assumes that in the case of the opposition not reaching a two thirds majority (51) in the Congress, “within 48 hours of the elections a political storm will be unleashed in the country””.52

An analysis of the results of the parliamentary elections of March 1973, from the department of Latin American Countries in the Soviet Chancellery,53 is less doom laden than the one above. The immediate threat to the UP government is postponed. The document characterises the situation in Chile as “maintaining an unstable balance”. The author once again feels at liberty to forecast difficulties ahead and puts the theme of the future as “the consolidation of power in the hands of the Left”54, a fact which never-

48 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR “Situation in Chile”, report written by O. Grek, February 21st 1973, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, F.139, O.28, Carp.12, Doc.7 (see the document in Appendix A.1.)
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 “In the case of the opposition not reaching...”, this expression assumes an internal conviction that it was most probable that the opposition would get the necessary results.
52 Ibid.
53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, “Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Chile”, report of March 16th 1973, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, F.139, O.28,Carp.12, Doc.7 (see text in Appendix A.2)
54 Ibid.
theless depends on fulfilling certain conditions: “consolidating the forces of the Left, overcoming the economic difficulties, attracting the masses and the patriotic sectors of the population to the side of the government and organising all the parties which make up the Unidad Popular to unmask and isolate the opposition”.\(^{55}\) The fact that complying with these conditions in Chile would be extremely difficult was not mentioned in the text.

The tone of the document of a document from the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the USSR, dated July 16th 1973 (see Appendix A.3), is radically different. It starts by recognising a “serious worsening” in the situation in Chile, and something not at all common in this type of document and therefore more relevant, confirms that “the UP government has no programme” for overcoming the critical economic situation.\(^{56}\)

To confirm this about a “revolutionary and friendly” regime means that the authors of the report could be accused of “defeatism” if the government of Allende was not really that hopeless. The political measures of Allende - civilian-military government, plan of emergency etc - are presented in the report as failed initiatives. It mentions that these same measures are contributing to the involvement of the military in politics, at the same time as pointing out that “the political circles of the bloc on the Left” (i.e. the UP), and especially the Socialist Party, are preparing for an armed conflict “considering it to be inevitable”. The final conclusion of the document points to the possibility of an “open armed confrontation” in Chile, notwithstanding the obligatory and repeated rhetorical invocations in almost all the Soviet analyses over the three years of the UP to the “unity of action of the party leaders of the forces of the Left with respect to the Army and the Opposition” and to the “elaboration of an exact programme to overcome the economic difficulties” as resources to save the situation.\(^{57}\)

In the last months of the UP, Soviet instructions to their institutions in Chile are very ambiguous. On the one hand, according to an ex-functionary of the Soviet Embassy in Chile, B. Tsyganchuk, some months before the denouement Soviet personnel in Chile were recommended to evacuate their families, which in general they did, expecting violence. Nevertheless, this was only a “recommendation”. Various families of the diplomatic staff (among them, the family of the person we interviewed) remained in

\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR “Regarding the Situation in Chile”, report of the 16th of July, from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the USSR, F.139, O.28, Carp.12, Doc.7 (see text in Appendix 1.3)

\(^{57}\) Ibid.
On the other hand, the arrival in Chile on July 1st 1973 of an important mission of the Soviet State Commission for Planning (Gosplan), two days after the rising of the 2nd Armoured Regiment (known as the Day of the Tanks or “El Tancazo”), to collaborate with the Chilean Office of National Planning (Odeplan) in the elaboration of a plan for the economic development of the country up to 1976, can put a different interpretation on things. The arrival of the economic team at such an inopportune moment can only be explained by inertia and a certain autonomy in the enormous Soviet bureaucratic regime: the negotiations regarding cooperation about planning had already taken too much time, and when everything was ready for the mission to materialise, it could not be put back, although circumstances had changed. As the members of the delegation remember, the danger of a coup was latent: nevertheless the personnel of the mission (which also included women) received no instructions whatsoever from the Embassy about what to do if one happened. Neither did the more senior members of the Embassy staff discuss the subject of a coup with personnel from the Chilean-Soviet Cultural Institute, which had on its staff Soviet teachers who taught Russian throughout the country.

There was a lot of comment among officials of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU at the end of the 70’s about the letter sent a day before the coup by the Soviet Ambassador to Chile, A.Basov, in which he assured the Soviet authorities that “Chile was advancing with safe and sure steps towards socialism”. B. Tsyganchuk confirmed to us that on Friday September 7th 1973 the Soviet Embassy in Santiago received a message from Moscow which

58 Interview with B. Tsyganchuk, Moscow, January 1998
59 Interview with V. Davydov, Moscow, April 1999. See also the report of V. Davydov “Information Regarding My Stay in the Republic of Chile between July and September 1973” (Archive of the Institute of Latin America, Moscow), 1973. Serie de Antecedentes No. 34, Centro de Estudios Publicos.
60 Interview with B. Tsyganchuk, Moscow, January 1998.
61 Interview with A. Siniavski, Professor of the University of People’s Friendship and teacher of Russian at the Chilean-Soviet Cultural Institute in 1973.
62 In the same way as many other relevant documents, this one is still inaccessible to researchers. Various people who worked in the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the 70’s assured us that they had seen it: nevertheless, as the information came from sources who were closely knit together, we could not discard the suspicion that that it might be a collective myth, a product of the unpopularity of Ambassador Basov with Latin American experts. However the version was unexpectedly confirmed to us by B. Tsyganchuk, ex-official of the Soviet Embassy in Santiago, who told us about the circumstances from which the ill-fated letter originated.
asked for information regarding the “rumours” from Western sources that a coup d’etat was on the point of happening in Chile. For the Soviet ambassador, the most reliable and safe source of information was the leadership of the Chilean CP: because of this, on the night of the same day, at a reception at the Bulgarian Embassy given to mark that country’s national day, he talked to the Secretary General of the Chilean CP, Luis Corvalan, about Moscow’s fears. According to Tsyganchuk, Corvalan took the Ambassador’s anxieties seriously, asked for a phone to make several calls and finally informed the Ambassador that the rumours were a series of false alarms originating from regular Army manoeuvres and that the Unidad Popular had everything under control. On the basis of that answer, the Ambassador prepared the letter which was received in Moscow on the first working day of the following week, the 10th of September 1973. 63

All the Soviet documents we revised and the information obtained from people we interviewed indicate that although Soviet analysts and officials, like the majority of international experts following events in Chile, considered the situation extremely fragile and unstable, they had nothing more than suspicions about the coup which was about to happen, and because of this, to help their Chilean “friends”, they supported them in their appraisals to scare away the phantoms.

It would appear that the Chilean Communists had so much success in convincing their Soviet counterparts about the “national peculiarities” 64 of the Chilean process, that, as I. Rybalkin (ex-head of the Chilean section in the International Department of the CC of the CPSU) told us, up to the last minute everyone hoped that “everything would melt away, it would all be solved alone, that this “Chilean peculiarity” would impose itself once again and find a solution to avoid a coup d’etat”. 65

63 Interview with B. Tsyganchuk, Moscow, January 1998.
64 Official Soviet Marxist doctrine proclaimed uniform and immutable laws for the carrying out of revolutions throughout the whole world. Open disagreement with them meant excommunication from the “International Communist Movement” and the Communist Parties, from their “Bolshevisation” at the beginning of the 30’s, were educated to consider them to be fundamental to their revolutionary “creed”. The Chilean Communist leaders of the 70’s believed profoundly in the universality of these “laws” and they would have been amazed if they had known that they were suspected of heterodoxy. Nevertheless in political practice, they acted trying to make their common sense, stemming from the national political culture, compatible with Marxist doctrine. Whatever lack of coincidence between the two was explained (in the first place to themselves) as a national “peculiarity” of Chile.
65 Interview with Y. Rybalkin, Moscow, August 1998.
2.2.5 Soviet arms for Chile

The most contradictory aspect of Soviet policy towards Chile in the last months of the Allende government has to do with the negotiations about the acquisition of Soviet armament for the Chilean Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{66} The subject was on the agenda from the moment Allende came to power:\textsuperscript{67} in this manner, according to I. Rybalkin, he intended, on the one hand, to satisfy the military interests in modern equipment and, on the other, to get a greater commitment from the USSR to his programme, which would not just be ideological.\textsuperscript{68} Certainly, if such acquisitions came off, they would imply a reorientation in the professional formation of the military towards Soviet training centres. According to Rybalkin, the subject of the acquisition of arms was brought up by Allende in a confidential interview he had with Brezhnev during his visit to Moscow at the end of 1972, and encountered a positive reply, in that negotiations were transferred to the Ministry of Defence of the USSR, which was the main Soviet organisation interested in this type of negotiation.\textsuperscript{69} The negotiations continued during the visit of General Carlos Prats to Moscow,\textsuperscript{70} but according to Chilean sources, as well as available Soviet documents and interviews with ex-Soviet officials and diplomats, there is no proof that these negotiations reached any con-

\textsuperscript{66} It is important to point out the USSR did not supply “self defence” groups of the parties on the Left with weapons, categorically rejecting the petitions from several parties of the UP to do so, especially the Socialist Party. The refusal was due to the fact that for the Soviets, as for the Chilean Communists, the solution to the Chilean problem was not the forming of an alternative “People’s Army”, which was what the so-called “revolutionary wing” was calling for (the Socialist Party and the MIR), but in obtaining the complete support of the Armed Forces, or in the case of a split, at least the majority. This was the objective behind the acquisition of Soviet war material.

\textsuperscript{67} Even before Allende assumed the Presidency, V. Teitelboim had indicated, in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador N.B.Alexseev, that Fidel Castro himself had suggested the idea to Allende through his daughter Taty (Beatriz) and had promised to do all he could to help. See N.B. Alexseev “Conversation of Ambassador N.B. Alexseev with Volodia Teitelboim”, October 14th 1970, in “Chile in the Archives of the USSR”, Estudios Publicos, 72 (1998), page 412.

\textsuperscript{68} Interview with Y. Rybalkin, Moscow 1998.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{70} The Central Committee of the CPSU gave explicit instructions to the Soviet media to cover in full the visit of Carlos Prats to the USSR, where he was given the treatment as the Head of “friendly” Armed Forces. Official information played up his visit to the “Kantemirovskaya” Division, where he was given a full presentation of the performance of Soviet tanks and other types of armament. One’s attention is called to the publicity given to this visit, because within the logic of the Cold War, it could not do anything else but increase the fears of the opposing bloc. (See the Serie de Antecedentes, No. 35, Centro de Estudios Publicos).
crete conclusion (because of lack of time or reluctance on behalf of sectors of the Chilean Armed Forces, according to various sources).\textsuperscript{71}

Nevertheless, according to the testimony of N. Leonov (who was then the head of the Analytical Department of the KGB) in 1973 the Soviets would have given the Chilean government a credit for 100 million dollars to buy Soviet arms (mainly tanks and artillery pieces). According to Leonov, that decision could only have come from Brezhnev.\textsuperscript{72} The ships with this equipment were already on their way to Chile, when, in the middle of August 1973, the most competent of the Soviet organisations arrived at the conclusion that a coup d’etat was imminent in the country and the highest leadership of the Soviet Union gave the order to stop the operation.\textsuperscript{73} It has to be said that other Soviet oral sources know nothing about this episode, although they do not categorically deny the probability of it taking place either.\textsuperscript{74} For everyone, including N. Leonov, it would show an absence of Soviet state policy towards the Chilean case and of Soviet action acting as a summary of sectarian policies, based on the appraisals and interests of he different Soviet institutions. In this case we are talking about the interests of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, in charge of exporting armaments, which had been given the go-ahead by the Politburo to take this step.\textsuperscript{75}

The acquisition of Soviet war material for the Armed Forces in Chile was done to help to push the unstable balance within those Armed Forces towards Allende, and therefore reinforce the strategy by which the Chilean CP hoped to confront the coup. According to Soviet Ambassador Basov, during a conversation in September 1972 where Luis Corvalan was present,

\textsuperscript{71} Jorge Edwards remembers meeting Carlos Prats in Paris on his return from Moscow, where the Chilean Commander in Chief commented to him “Grechko (Minister of Defence of the USSR) has offered our army Russian tanks, with long term credit”. “And what are they like” asked Edwards. “Good” replied Prats, “but they won’t get to Chile”. In other words, Jorge Edwards concludes “Prats thought that our Army would revolt rather than receive tanks from Grechko and everything that implicated, such as technical assistance and a transfer of ideology”. (See Jorge Edwards “Persona non grata”. 1986, page 426). Also see the survey made by E.M. Korry “The United States in Chile and Chile in the United States”, Estudios Publicos, 72 (1998), pages 53-56.

\textsuperscript{72} N. Leonov “Soviet Intelligence in Latin America during the Cold War”, Estudios Publicos, 73 (1999), page 57.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, page 55.

\textsuperscript{74} Interviews with I.Rybalkin and K.Jachaturov, Moscow 1998. N.Leanov’s version was also not denied by Chilean military sources. General E.Canessa (retired) declared that although he knew nothing about the acquisition of such material, he considered it probable ( declarations in the newspaper La Tercera, Thursday September 24th 1998). See also Ximena Hintzpeter “Chile and the USSR: uncertain relations”, Punto de Referencia, No. 205, (1998), Centro de Estudios Publicos.

\textsuperscript{75} Interviews with N. Leonov and K. Jachaturov, Moscow 1998.
Volodia Teitelboim talked about a meeting he had had with the Chief of Army Counter Intelligence, General Sepulveda. Teitelboim told the Ambassador that “we reached an agreement about the co-ordination of the security forces and the parties of the popular bloc.... It was decided at the same time to mobilise those forces who were loyal to the government”. That is to say that the Communist Party was preparing to resist a coup with military forces loyal to Allende in conjunction and co-ordination with the forces that had been mobilised from the “popular bloc”.

Although history does not recognise the subjunctive tense and concentrates on what actually happens in the past, in front of testimonies like this one cannot help but think what would have happened in Chilean history if those policies had managed to come about.

2.3 The 11th of September 1973 seen from the Soviet Embassy in Santiago

Even though they feared a military coup, the 11th of September took their Soviet allies by surprise. Regarding the coup as seen from the windows of the Soviet Embassy in Santiago we have the testimony of B.Tsyganchuk. In spite of the assurances of normality that were sent to Moscow and received there on the 10th of September, the Embassy laid on several measures that were out of the ordinary for their personnel, including diplomats working on shift as guards. On the night of the 10th until the 11th of September, the person we interviewed was on guard and therefore became the first Soviet to be aware of the coup.

The initial information which the Embassy received and sent to Moscow came from Chilean radio channels which managed to capture, among others Allende’s last speech and the Military Junta’s wave bands, as well as conversations among those who participated in the assault on the Moneda, which have only been recently made known in Chile through the publication of Patricia Verdugo’s book. According to B.Tsyganchuk, he did not only listen to these conversations form the Embassy’s radio but

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77 Interview with B.Tsyganchuk, Moscow January 1998.

also recorded them, from which he assumes that such recordings must have been numerous. As far as his tape was concerned, when he returned to Moscow he handed it over to his superiors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He was also the one who had to send Moscow the message about the death of Allende. He told us that the report that “La Moneda taken and the President dead” was automatically interpreted by him as that the President had been assassinated and he put this in his message. This instantaneous mental reaction (at this stage we can discard the possibility that there was conscious ideological manipulation involved, since diplomatic officials had to inform about the facts and they were enormously careful not to fall into speculations which could be interpreted in different ways) can also be understood from the rules of language, where “revolutionary leaders” could only fall by “being assassinated by the enemy” and from a culture where the concept of suicide simply did not exist.

The Soviet officials resided in the upper part of Santiago, the same area where the Embassy was, so that they did not personally see any of the bloody events that happened. On the 12th of September the Soviet diplomatic seat on Apoquindo Avenue was surrounded by soldiers who did not allow anyone in or out. However, after a short time, this blockade of the embassy was lifted and there were no more openly hostile gestures towards the Soviet Embassy, according to Tsyganchuk, unlike what was happening with the Embassies of Cuba and other Latin American countries.

The dimensions of the coup and the systematic breakdown that happened in Chile were not appreciated at first by Soviet diplomatic personnel in Chile. All regular contacts from their sources of information in Chilean society were interrupted. Moscow was consistently demanding information that they did not get. Moscow was still waiting for news about the coup.

Footnotes:
79 The author of these lines remembers having read at the end of the 70’s the transcript of these conversations in the Cuban magazine “Bohemia”
80 Interview with B. Tsyganchuk, January 1998. The news that Allende “had been executed” was also transmitted by influential media in the West (see Note 69, later on)
81 The members of the delegation of the Soviet State Committee of Planning (Gosplan) who were staying at the Hotel Conquistador in the centre of Santiago saw various conflictive situations but their impressions were late in getting to the knowledge of the Embassy.
82 Tsyganchuk remembers situations that were apparently paradoxical, like the good neighbourly relations, which bordered on friendship, with Arellano Stark who lived in the same building. In the first days of the coup, the general’s wife together with the wife of the Soviet diplomat used to walk about with the latter’s baby, the officer’s wife thereby guaranteeing the safety of her Soviet neighbour.
about the situation of Luis Corvalan and the Chilean Communist Party. Although one imagines that emergency plans existed between the security personnel of the Embassy and those of the Chilean CP, in practice nothing functioned on the 11th of September: contacts failed and during the first days of the coup the Soviets lost all type of communication with the Chilean CP.  

Days after communication was re-established, not via the regular methods but through Communist professionals, doctors and others, whom Soviet official personnel, who were very uncommunicative and who had very little human links with Chilean society, knew for professional reasons. With the re-establishment of those links the Soviet representatives got to know of the size of the repression against supporters of the UP, a picture which was very different from what Soviet diplomatic personnel had experienced.

### 2.4 The suspension of diplomatic relations

It is very possible that the suspension of diplomatic relations, which made possible the presentation of Pinochet’s regime as the symbol of a “fascist military dictatorship”, was not actually too clear at first. In fact, the USSR maintained diplomatic relations with the military regimes in Brazil and Uruguay and did not break relations afterwards with the Argentine military. It seems, at this moment the Chilean military also had no intention of breaking relations with the USSR. B. Tsyganchuk remembers that a few days after the coup, the Ambassador received a formal invitation to a meeting from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Junta, Admiral Carvajal. The first secretary of the Embassy was also at the meeting. The reason behind the meeting was to show the new government’s interest in maintaining normal diplomatic relations with the USSR, information which was passed over to Moscow by personnel from the Embassy. Nevertheless, on September 17th in Sofia, Bulgaria, Brezhnev referred to the events in Chile as a “fascist coup”. The following day the Ambassador received the decision from Moscow about the suspension of relations. Between the 21st and 23rd of

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83 Interview with B. Tsyganchuk, Moscow January 1998  
84 Ibid.  
September, in three charter flights of Aeroflot, all Soviet citizens who were in Chile “on service” left the country.\(^86\)

Apparently there was no sole opinion in the Soviet leadership regarding the idea of maintaining or suspending relations with the Chilean military regime. The recently published memoirs of S. Mikoyan (for many years Director of the magazine “Latin America” in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and son of the President of the Supreme Soviet, A. Mikoyan) indicate that the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by A.A. Gromyko, was against the suspension of relations, while the “ideologues” of the Central Committee, M. Suslov and B. Ponomarev, were its most active promotors.\(^87\) Within the Soviet hierarchy, their weight, both being members of the Politburo, was greater than that of Gromyko, who was then only just a candidate for the Politburo. This version of events is also confirmed by various of the persons we interviewed.\(^88\)

Why did the Soviet leadership finally take the decision to suspend relations with Chile while maintaining relations with the rest of the dictatorships in the Southern Cone (the Southern part of Latin America)? We believe that the image of the UP as a “revolutionary process” was a considerable influence on the decision and that with all its limitations it had an ideological affinity with the Soviet ideology and experience. What was also important were the brutal images of the coup, with the bombardment of the Palace and the death of the President which were transmitted by the media throughout the world. However we also believe that the decisive factor for the Soviets in favour of this step was the relatively low profile of economic relations between Chile and the USSR. Chile did not have great importance for the USSR in geopolitical terms, and so the USSR “would not lose much” in economic terms because of the suspension: they would gain much more capitalising on the political effects of the event. At the same time another important factor for the Soviet decision was the reaction of Western “progressive” public opinion, in spite of the fact that their opinions of the UP process were different from those of the Soviet leadership.\(^89\) For the Soviet

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\(^{86}\) Interview with B. Tsyganchuk, Moscow January 1998.

\(^{87}\) S. Mikoyan “Soviet Union and Latin America: Political and Strategic Domain” (1995) page 41.

\(^{88}\) Interviews with K.Jachaturov (Moscow, February 1998) and with B. Tsyganchuk (Moscow, January 1998).

\(^{89}\) On the vision of Chile as perceived by “progressive” Western public opinion, including prestigious sections of the media, see E.M.Korry “The United States in Chile and Chile in the United States”, Estudios Publicos, 72 (1998) pages 23 and 24.
ideologues, in spite of the “weaknesses and vacillations” of the UP they were not dealing with a “Social Democratic” process alien to their ideology. The level of committment of the USSR and its communist Party to the Chilean CP, considered as the “driving force” behind the process, as well as the capacity of the latter to present the Chilean process through a system of categories and images relating to the Russian revolutionary experience, made the Soviet ideologues view the experience of the UP as an attempt, even though a failed one, to bring forward the revolution according to their ideological position.

3. SOVIET EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE OF THE “CHILEAN EXPERIMENT”: ITS IMPORTANCE FOR EXTRENAL IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE.

After the coup, especially in the first few years, an avalanche of ideological, academic and propagandist literature was produced in the USSR dedicated to Chile. The principal theme was an analysis of the causes of the defeat. On the one hand with the breaking off of relations, Chile disappeared for a long time from Soviet diplomatic interest, as well as from academic analysis orientated towards the formulation of bilateral policies. Instead the importance of official ideological interpretation increased, which was expressed in confidential documents from the analytical centres of the Central Committee of the CPSU and mentions of the Chilean case in official documents from the CPSU Congresses (separate mentions of the Chilean case had begun in 1971 and continued in later Congresses of the CPSU after the coup).* Among them the material for discussion carried out in February 1974 in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC of the CPSU stands out and we are going to analyse this in some detail later on.91

On the other hand there was the academic debate between Soviet Latin-Americanists, which included a great deal of different opinions, and whose range shows the limits of what could be tolerated in discussing the subject.

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The quantity and importance of the propagandist documents also increased, principally being the work of journalists and those agencies which were in charge of spreading massive amounts of propaganda and counter-propaganda. We can distinguish among them texts “for internal consumption”, principally for the adolescent and juvenile sectors of the population, whose objective was the creation of symbols giving a contemporary romantic revolutionary imagery, and texts “for export”, which were charged with putting the Chilean case within the bipolarism of the Cold War, and linking the coup in Chile directly to “the imperialist policies of the U.S.A.” It needs to be pointed out that in the doctrinaire documents as well as the academic or propagandist ones, Chile is presented as an emblem.

3.1 Doctrinaire Documents

Soviet political evaluation of the Chilean military coup and the failure of the “Unidad Popular experiment” began immediately after the events via open documents of a theoretical character, drawn up by institutions in the Academy of Sciences, and confidential ones, prepared by analytical departments of the CC of the CPSU.92

From the beginning the discussion of the Chilean theme found itself within the framework of a much wider ideological debate which Soviet communism was beginning to have at this moment (starting with Chile) with the nascent Eurocommunist current in the principal Communist parties of the West.93 The evolution of the Soviet perception of the events that had happened in Chile would be incomprehensible if taken outside this discussion.

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92 It needs to be clarified here that there always existed a dichotomy in the Soviet Social Sciences between the official ideological organisations, in charge of the development and interpretation of official doctrine, and the academic institutions (like the Academy of Sciences and the Universities), dedicated to more varied studies, among which can be observed wider criteria, within such limits as were acceptable to the system. On the other hand, studies in Political and Social Sciences, in both types of institutions, could be either open (as long as all the requirements of censorship had been met) or confidential. The latter (the confidential ones) normally contained data or interpretations which might contradict the official viewpoint.

93 Motivated by the idea of achieving socialism via the “peaceful road”, the European Communist Parties were caught up in that strategy from the 70’s. This explains their special attention to the “Chilean experiment” and their reaction to its failure. The principal conclusion that the European communists came to in the Chilean case was of the need to create large political majorities in favour of changes within the framework of a democratic system. This implied a) the renunciation of the idea of a “dictatorship of the proletariat” (still a key point in Soviet texts) as it contradicts the
In fact, in general terms, the official Soviet vision of the Chilean process evolved between 1973 and 1980 from a position very close to the one expressed before or directly after the coup by the Chilean CP, which blamed the failure of the UP’s experiment mainly on the extreme Left - even though they had proclaimed, right from the beginning, that the “lesson of Chile” consisted in remembering that “every revolution must know how to defend itself” (which was amply understood) towards one which emphasised the need for “defending the revolution”, which was understood to mean an armed defence.

The evolution of the position was done in a very subtle way through a moving of emphasis. The initial interpretation of “every revolution must know how to defend itself” supposed, in the Chilean case, through “the peaceful road”, the anxiety to create and maintain stable majorities in favour of the process. The more classical interpretation (defence equals weapons) was also present in the debate but in a secondary and subordinate role. When the tone of the discussion about Eurocommunism began to rise, the first interpretation began to be weakened more and more in Soviet texts until it disappeared while the second was strengthened. We shall now analyse this process on the basis of concrete documents.

3.1.1 Established bases for the official Soviet viewpoint on the “Chilean way”

The first official interpretation of the defeat of the Unidad Popular in Chile was given in a confidential discussion about “revolution and counter-revolution” in Chile in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (IML) of the Central Committee of the CPSU in February 1974, a few months after the coup.

democratic principle and b) finding wider alliances which would allow the participation of the Communist Party in power, based on electoral majorities. The latter was translated into the politics of “historical compromise” by Italian communism, which aimed at the establishment of a strategic alliance between Communism and the Christian Democrats in their country (a project which was cut short by the murder of Aldo Moro, their principal ally in the Christian Democrats).

94 The Chilean case is mentioned in this sense in a separate paragraph in L.Brezhnev’s report to the XXV Congress of the CPSU. See the Communist Party of the Soviet Union “XXV Congress of the CPSU: Documents and Material” (1976), page 43.

95 In post-1979 documents, this idea is developed by contrasting the failure of the “revolution” in Chile (it was only in the 80’s that the concept of “revolution” was used in the Chilean case) with the triumph of armed revolution in Nicaragua.
For its importance in the elaboration of guide lines for the Soviet interpretation of Chilean events, we shall analyse here the documents from that discussion. The central report was done by A.N. Sobolev, Director of the International Communist Movement of the IML, and the maximum technical authority for themes relating to the International Communist movement within the Soviet ideological apparatus.96

The report begins with a reaffirmation of the “historical offensive” of the “forces of peace, democracy and socialism”.97 From there, the defeat which is analysed is explained as being a manifestation of the contradictory character of world development. It also confirms, in the same first paragraph, the maturity of of the “objective conditions” and the weakness of the “subjective factor” for revolution in “capitalist countries” in general.98

This starting point of the interpretation is called up to confirm the validity of the doctrine in general, a significant worry, since nobody, either in the country affected or in the West in general, would have ventured to question one of the ideological principles of the century in its totality, only because of the Chilean failure. Secondly, the Chilean experience is analysed in the context of “capitalist countries” and not in the context of “countries on the road to development”,99 which demonstrates the linking of the Chilean theme to that of European countries and the linking of the debate to the procedures of the Communist parties in these countries. The document recognises this by declaring that “a hardened ideological struggle is developing over the events in Chile which is essentially anti-Communist and anti-Marxist”.100 An affirmation of this type supposes a defensive attitude beforehand of the proposed ideological focus. The supervisors of the “purity” and rigidity of official Soviet ideological doctrine already feel themselves hemmed in by the multiplicity of interpretations of the social and political reality, in the first place, within the Left itself.101

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96 Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC of the CPSU (report from A.N.Sobolev), “Revolution and Counter-revolution: the Lessons of Chile and the Problems of the Class Struggle” (1975), photocopy for restricted use.
97 Ibid, page 1.
98 Ibid, page 1. The “objective factor” is understood to be a maturity in the “contradictions of capitalism” which could make a “socialist revolution” possible, while the “subjective factor” refers to the capability of the “parties in the vanguard” to carry out such revolutions.
99 Ibid, page 1
100 Ibid, page 2.
101 In the first months after the coup in Chile, a wide range of interpretations appeared in publications of the Left in Europe and Latin America. The Italian and
In spite of the fact that the document is confidential, it contains many references to the Chilean Communist Party, which it recognises as having the first right to analyse the causes of the defeat. It does not limit itself to criticise the errors of the UP but to appreciate its successes - and this will be repeated in all subsequent Soviet works on the subject. It compares the truncated Chilean experience of the “peaceful road” with the 1905 revolution in Russia and with the Paris Commune, attributing the failure in the category of a “general test” for future victorious revolutions.

The principal objects of the polemic are the “ultra-Left”, “Trotskyists” and “Maoists” (the main incarnations of evil in Soviet ideological discussion) which deny the possibility of a “peaceful road” and only recognise armed revolution. Various authors of the Western “radical Left” are mentioned on this account, but Cuba’s position is kept in mind. The fundamental objective of the report and of the “discussion” in general is a defence of the “peaceful road” against the so-called “ultra-Left”. At the same time, the first warnings appear here against “reformist deviations” that exaggerate the gradualism of the process: “In several cases the events in Chile provoked feelings of insecurity, including the inclination to search for “new” ways of developing the workers movement, where fluctuations towards reformism were felt”. This is already a direct allusion to the first expressions of Eurocommunism but the discussion had not yet started and the “deviators” are not named.

French communists came near to each other by formulating the idea of “historical compromise”, i.e. of the need for an alliance between the Left and the Centre (the Communist Party and the Christian Democrats in the Italian case), so as to permit the CP to come to power (“the peaceful road”) with the support of a stable majority which would include workers as well as sectors of the middle class. This project explicitly renounced the “dictatorship of the proletariat”, and pronounced itself in favour of the values of representative democracy (see, for example, “I Communisti Italiani e Chili” (1974)). At the same time, sectors of the Latin American Left, inspired by the Cuban revolution, saw in the defeat of the UP the confirmation of their thesis on the impossibility of a “peaceful road” in Latin America. In several Latin American interpretations there also appears, more or less clearly, the idea that the “USSR betrayed Allende”, a reference to the lack of economic and/or military aid from the Soviets (on this subject, see I. Turrent “The USSR in Latin America: the Case of the Unidad Popular in Chile, 1970 - 1973”, (1984).
The objective of the document is not so much to explain the events that happened in Chile through a concrete analysis of the political situation, but to channel the interpretation to the Procrustean bed of official ideological doctrine. From there on a great part of the debate centres on the scholarly problem of the stages and sub-stages of the revolution.109

The practical significance of all these sophistications is reduced to the following: if the “revolution” was still not at the “democratic and anti-imperialist” stage, it would therefore need a wider alliance with sectors from the middle class and the “national bourgeoisie”: if, on the other hand, it was at the socialist stage, an alliance was required only with those who would support transformations of a socialist character. Without marrying itself with any of the positions that the two poles within the UP represented - headed by the CP and the SP respectively - this first Soviet interpretation found itself imprisoned in the scholastic jungle of the stages and sub-stages of transition.

Avoiding reproach or accusations directly at the Chilean Communist Party for the defeat, this viewpoint of one of the most authorised of Soviet ideologues puts forward the factors which contributed to the failure as being “lessons from Chile” for the International Communist movement.110 Rather ambiguous and difficult to take on, these “lessons” can be interpreted as reproaches for not insufficient decision or for not taking a harder line. They deal with the first interpretations of the Chilean coup on the part of Soviet ideologues and it is obvious in the change of tone and the focus of the relationship from what was written in the USSR about Chile prior to 1973. As we have stated above, in spite of the amount of analytical work which was produced before 1973, the rules of the ideological game prevented the authors of confidential reports and especially of open articles and books from commenting about the collapse of the “Chilean experiment” and/or criticising the running of the process (which was up to then apparently successful) by the UP and the Chilean CP.

He goes on to emphasise very strongly that “the peaceful way of developing the revolution is a hardened class struggle in all spheres of social life, by using all the methods and means of struggle, save those of civil war.”111 In another part of the text, this idea appears even more stron-

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110 Ibid, pages 35-36.
111 Ibid, pages 35-36.
gly and there is no mention made of “exceptions”: “So as not to be taken by surprise, the working class must be prepared for all forms of struggle. The route towards the domination of all forms of struggle also implies the necessary political and psychological preparation of the working class and all the workers, and their permanent availability to defend the revolution from whatever manœuvre of the enemy.”112 For Soviet speeches directed at the “International Communist Movement” of the time, where the clear inclination was for the “peaceful road”, these words sounded both harsh and dissonant.

A curious peculiarity of the Soviet understanding of the “peaceful road” is shown in the criticism which Sobolev makes of the Chilean Communist Party and the UP, emphasising “the Leninist idea on the necessity of breaking the bourgeois State apparatus in the course of the revolution and substitute it for the apparatus of popular power”. One supposes that the “peaceful road” adds to the problem of tempos and rhythms of this process of rupture but does not change its essence.113

The analysis of the Chilean Armed Forces in the process and politics of the UP starts with a confirmation of the over-evaluation of the neutrality and constitutionalism of the military by the Chilean Left. Sobolev sees the Armed Forces as a profoundly politicised and heterogenous factor in the chilean revolution. According to him, the left failed to “democratise” the army and attract it to the side of the UP.114 Nevertheless the outcome is not seen as fatally inevitable. The solution was to go and attract the majority of the masses of soldiers “to the side of democracy” and of taking advantage of the existence of an “important progressive sector” among the officers so as “to isolate the reactionary fascist elements in the high command”. The failure of the UP in its “struggle for the army” can be explained by the failures in its social policy115 (other authors attribute it to a failure of its social policy towards the middle class). However, hand in hand with the idea of “democratisation” of the Armed Forces, comes the necessity for “the political, psychological and organisational preparation of the working class to defend the revolution”.116

At the same time, implicitly responding to the growing Eurocommunism, Sobolev made sure of underlining the key hypothesis of Soviet Marxism that the only true socialism in existence was in the USSR and its allies,

112 Ibid, page 37.
114 Ibid, page 42.
116 Ibid, page 43.
which should also be the final objective of the Chilean process, and therefore that the roads to get there are not so fundamental and can vary from one stage to another. Sobolev, then, discards the relationship between the “strategic conception” (i.e. the model of society which is being proposed) and the “forms of struggle”. We must remember that for the European Left of the time, the “Chilean experiment” held a special attraction precisely because it tried to carry out socialism via the “peaceful road” without recourse to civil war, and that eventually could lead to a different model of socialism, one that was more humane, and not degenerate into Stalin type totalitarianism.

The absence of policies to democratise and attract the Armed Forces is the main reproach which is made against the Chilean CP. This does not mean, however, that the Soviet ideologues, a posteriori, say that the “revolutionary wing” of the UP were correct. In fact, the comments that have been recently expressed, come accompanied by a strong criticism of the ultra-Left, which acted both within and without the UP, and included sectors of the Socialist Party. This ambivalence can be explained by the divorce between the ideological loyalties and lines which formed part of the Soviet political routine on the one hand, and which favoured the line of the CP, and the feeling of distrust, even though not expressed publicly, but profoundly rooted in Soviet ideology, that this dangerous “peaceful road” was capable of leading to the sin of revisionism and reformism.

After all the references to the errors mentioned about the UP and the “lessons” that could be learned from the Chilean process, which destroyed a great part of what the European left understood to be the “peaceful road to socialism”, the principal Soviet ideologue concluded, on the subject of the International Communist movement, that “the failure of the Unidad Popular is not down to the inconsistency of the peaceful road to revolution but rather to the extreme complexity of the historical situation, to the enormous strength of pressure from American and International imperialism and to the ferocity of the resistance of the reaction, as much as to mistakes in the actions of the UP, their faulty theories and policies and their tactical errors”. The main hypothesis of a peaceful road to revolution comes out immaculate. The themes of “imperialist pressure” and “reactionary resistance” are not the object of analysis but are brought to the dessert as an

120 Ibid, page 46.
121 Ibid, pages 6-8.
implicitly recognised factor. What the report intended was not to explain what happened in Chile but to put its inconvenient situation into the official ideological Talmud.

Later on, on the basis of opinions expressed in the closed discussion, a series of open publications came out to reaffirm the “peaceful road” to revolution, separating the waters from the Eurocommunists. The importance of these publications lies in the fact that, unlike the confidential documents, these were destined to be read by representatives of the “International Communist Movement”, and, in the first place, by the Chilean Communist leaders. The positions which the authors of these texts occupied within the Soviet ideological hierarchy should have indicated to both national and foreign readers that they were dealing with the official point of view.

The same A. Sobolev, the main speaker at the closed discussion, published, a certain time after this event, a “programmed” article about Chile in an open magazine of the Academy of Sciences, entitled “The Experience of Chile and the Problems of class Struggle”\(^{122}\), where, leaving aside references to the need for fighting against “mistaken” interpretations of the chilean process, the main points in his confidential report were repeated. Afterwards a great deal of publications appeared, with a greater margin of differences, but all based on his fundamental guidelines.

The guidelines were confirmed later on by V. Volski who was then the Director of the Institute of Latin America, in a series of articles - among them, “The Problems of a Peaceful Road towards Socialism” (1975) - published at the same time both in Russian and Spanish, and which became immediately available to the Chilean Communist leadership in the USSR. In spite of his job as Director of an academic institute, Volski, who was neither a specialist on Chile, nor on political themes (his speciality was Geography), appears in the authorship of these texts rather as the official ideologist.

Within this type of writing we also find the book written by three officials of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Kudachkin, Borisov and Tkachenko “The Chilean Revolution: Its Experience and Significance” (1977), and another from one of the most creative of Marxist theorists (up to where doctrine permits), Yu. Krasin “The Theory of the Socialist Revolution: The Leninist Inheritance and the Con-

\(^{122}\) A. Sobolev, “Experiencias de Chile y Problemas de la Lucha de Clases” (1974). Es importante agregar que si bien la revista académica en la que fue publicado este artículo salía sólo en ruso, este artículo fue traducido al castellano y distribuido como separata, junto con otros documentos propagandísticos en idiomas extranjeros.
temporary World” (1977). All these publications developed and repeated the hypothesis that the “the peaceful road” did not overrule “the laws of the revolution” and did not signify a renunciation of the “dictatorship of the proletariat”. In those years the adhesion (or rejection) to this formula marked the dividing line within the International Communist movement. It is interesting to point out today that the subject of Chile in the 70’s attracted very different elements from the Soviet Social Sciences. We find among the authors of works about Chile numerous people, nothing to do with Latin American studies, as such, and who, later on, are going to play important roles in Russian politica and thought.123

3.2 Chile in the Soviet academic studies of post 1973

In contrast to the doctrinaire texts, which start with a defence of ideology and adapt to it, where they can, examples of their interpretation of the Chilean case, the best works of the Latin-Americanists, among them, for example, the authors of the confidential report of the Institute of Latin America about Chile analysed in Section 2.2.2, now present in their open publications more realistic pictures of the circumstances surrounding the failure of the UP, without being accused of defeatism.

The margins of freedom of opinion for academic authors were marked out by the official position of the CPSU on the subject (if there was one) and by the position of the “brother party”, which jealously followed the Soviet publications about its area, trying to see if there was any implicit message for it in the nuances of interpretation. For the specialised Soviet

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123For example, Yu. Kariakin, dissident philosopher, was in charge of Soviet chronology for the 1000 days of Allende and participated, together with M.Kudachkin and others, in the edition of that fundamental work “Lessons from Chile”. Yu. Kariakin, more famous in Russia for his works on Dostoevsky and for having been one of the most radical deputies in the first Congress of Deputies during the time of Gorbachev, which was democraticall elected, today is one of the most fervent anti-Communist intellectuals in Russia. In the 70’s he wrote with passion about Chile, apparently seeing in Allende’s project an alternative of “socialism with a human face”. On the other hand we encountered a peculiar publication, dated 1976, under the title of “Latin America in the Fight against Reaction and Neo-Colonialism: The Fight of the Communist Parties of Latin America against the Neo-Colonialism of the United States , by the Anti-imperialist Front”. Its author was G. Selezniov, actual president of the Duma (Parliament) in Russia, director of the Communist Party of Russia and one of the most influential politicians in the country: it deals with the publication of his doctoral thesis for the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the CPSU, an obligatory requisite for promotion in the nomenclature. It is also about Chile.
reader, from the name of the author and the magazine where the article appeared, it was clear if it was dealing with a definition of the official line and a text which would be taken into some consideration in the elaboration of concrete policies, or if it was dealing with a debate about ideas between researchers dedicated to the subject, which would only influence middle level officials in an indirect way regarding the taking of decisions.\textsuperscript{124}

The majority of the publications dedicated to specific aspects of the Chilean process combined praise for the achievements of the Allende government with a criticism of the errors, supposedly avoidable, which went on accumulating during its final period. The majority of the authors explicitly and vehemently reject the idea that the “Chilean road” inasmuch as it was the “peaceful road”, would not have been viable and was condemned to failure beforehand. The fervour of the argument makes one suspect that that in many cases they believed the opposite. The failure was attributed to the “subjective factor”, errors in leading the “revolutionary vanguard” in diverse campaigns of political and social activity.\textsuperscript{125}

Among the studies of an academic nature we can highlight “A Political Chronicle of the Chilean Revolution” (1975), prepared by I. Zorina and Yu. Kariakin,\textsuperscript{126} a valiant attempt to reconstruct the 1000 days of Allende, day after day, through the press and sources available to Soviet authors. It

\textsuperscript{124} Many Western studies of Soviet politics never managed to perceive this distinction and were based on texts which differed a lot among themselves about Soviet politics. See for example, I. Turrent “Latin America and the Soviet Union: The Case of the Chilean Unidad Popular” (1977). The authoress, who does not read Russian, reconstructs Soviet policy towards Chile through open Soviet publications in foreign languages, which include propagandist works and the version of the magazine “Latin America” in Spanish, trying to discover the evolution of Soviet policy through the nuances of language in these documents. Her study can explain about the perceptions of Soviet thought with respect to Chile, directed towards overseas, but not about actual policy per se.

\textsuperscript{125} M. Kudachkin, A. Kutsenov, Yu. Kariakin and N. Klobashin (editors) “Lessons from Chile” (1977). The book, which is intended to be a fundamental analysis of the Chilean case and, in a certain way, “to close the subject”, includes articles about the following subjects: economic problems of the Chilean revolution (E. Kosarev); the working class in the Chilean revolution (T. Ogurtsova); unions and revolutionary transformations (L. Pegusheva); Unidad Popular and the urban middle stratum (N. Konovalova); Unidad Popular and the agrarian question (A. Galkina); the government and the Armed Forces (A. Shulgovski); Unidad Popular and the Catholic Church (N. Potashinskaia); revolution and the Christian Democrat Party (I. Zorina); the ultra-Left and the revolutionary process in Chile (N. Kolobashin); Unidad Popular and the methods of mass communication (A. Medvedenko) etc. Also see, for example, M. Kulakov, “Agrarian transformations and Anti-Government Opposition in the Countryside” (1977); V. Kurochkin “The Right Wing Press and the Armed Forces in Chile” (1975); E. Kosarev “The Economy and the Peaceful Road to Revolution” (1974) etc.

reveals the level of knowledge about the subject existing in the USSR and shows which events were considered more or less significant. It can be interpreted as a “chronicle of lost possibilities”, as it hints at the great prospect that the Chilean “peaceful road” would have been able to project: it registers all the attempts to reach an understanding with the political centre up to the last days of the Unidad Popular government, as well as the measures and proposals of the Communist Party in favour of advancing this process. In all the points of discrepancy between the Communist and Socialist Parties regarding the conduct of the government, it explicitly takes a position in favour of the Communists, while the actions of the ultra-Left are presented as being the main cause for the failure to reach an understanding. Although it is a valuable study, the authors do not always manage to point out the most significant political events, especially when they deal with the actions of the government or the declarations of its leaders which provoked great concern among different groups in Chilean society (businessmen, the middle class, the military, the media etc). It does not reflect the dynamic of internal economic difficulties, including inflation and the supply problem. The discontent of the small and medium size businessmen with expropriations is mentioned in the context of excesses of the ultra-Left, without mentioning the blurred limits of these policies on the part of the government, or the complicated relationship which existed between Allende himself and the ultra-Left (already mentioned in the confidential report of 1972).

The different poles of interpretation of the failure of the UP can be seen in the works of Yu. Koroliov and K. Maidanik, both of them authors of prestige, whose opinions were considered by the decision makers.

In 1976 Yu. Koroliov published his book, “Chile: Revolution and Counter-Revolution” (1976), where, supported by quotes from documents of the CPSU and the Chilean Communist Party, he interprets the insufficient “defence of the revolution” as a failure of the Left to create a wider alliance with the middle sectors of Chilean society and its principal political representative, the Christian Democrats. The change of direction in the Armed Forces towards positions contrary to the UP and their option of a coup d’etat is not presented as something inevitable but as related to the incapacity of the UP to satisfy the expectations of the Middle Class. The “peaceful road” is possible, always and when it is supported by a solid social and political majority.

We must recognise that the author carefully avoids the theme of how to obtain such a majority in this interpretation, which is quite close to
that of the Eurocommunists, and which necessarily implies a vision of a very different society.\textsuperscript{127}

The article of K. Maidanik “Regarding the Lessons of Chile” (1974) is in disagreement with these and the majority of publications.\textsuperscript{128} The last eternal romantic revolutionary of the Soviet Latin-Americanists, perhaps the best known in the political and academic ambience of the continent, is the only Soviet author whose analysis of the defeat agrees with the diagnosis of the Chilean Socialist Party at the time: they had to advance more rapidly and pass to other stages and forms of revolution. The peaceful road in Latin America can only serve as an initial stage of the process. The publication provoked strong reactions from the leadership of the Chilean Communist Party, which believed it was a new version of official opinion. The officials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had to give explanations in private, pointing out that it represented the particular point of view of the researcher. Nevertheless the text was widely circulated and commented on by people in charge of taking decisions in Soviet Latin American policies.\textsuperscript{129}

3.3 Chile in Soviet propaganda: the theme of North American intervention in Chile

We also encountered very different authors in the third group of publications about Chile in the USSR. These were openly propagandist publications, for internal Soviet consumption as well as for use in the pro-

\textsuperscript{127} In the 70’s Koroliov was one of the Soviet academic authors who was most appreciated by Chilean Communists. Nevertheless, his opinions about the evolution of Chile under the military regime, poured out at the end of the 80’s, were rudely disqualified by his former collaborators.

\textsuperscript{128} K. Maidanik “Regarding the Lessons of Chile”. This Soviet researcher was characterised, from the Sixties onwards, by the constant closeness of his positions to those of the “pro-Cuban” Latin American Left, as well as for his great emotional involvement in the “Latin American revolution” and his personal friendship with many of its leaders. His relationship with those who took decisions appear to be somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, his positions always distanced themselves from official ones and from those predominant in academic circles, which meant that he constantly came under party criticism and punishments and suffered the condescending smiles of his colleagues. On the other, in spite of this, his analyses were in constant demand from the different organisations in charge of taking decisions (from the CC of the CPSU to the KGB), whose Latin American experts maintained a fluid communication with him which he himself considered to be a personal friendship. (Interviews with K. Maidanik, N. Leonov, V. Kazakov and A. Sosnovski, Moscow, 1997-1999).

\textsuperscript{129} From the 80’s up to now, he is the Soviet (Russian) Latin Americanist most quoted in Chilean Communist publications.
propaganda war against the USA. Here we found biographical novels about Salvador Allende, Victor Jara and other martyrs of the Chilean Left, novels, theatrical pieces set in Chile from Soviet authors (mainly journalists), documentary reports and other similar writings about the coup. It is important to point out that only in this group of writings, especially in ones coming from the press agency Novosti, whose function, among other things, was to spread Soviet propaganda overseas, appeared the subject of North American intervention in Chile. It is these editorials which comment on and later publish in Russian the report from the Church Commission, and the book of the North American attorney Propper, “Labyrinth” (1980). Practically all the references to US support for the coup are based on North American sources and the subject itself appears not so much as a debate or explanation about the defeat of the “Chilean experiment”, but as a part of the ideological struggle with the USA.

The absence of the subject of North American intervention in Chile from the academic and theoretical texts is explained by the fact that they belong to the area of discussion about “the theory of revolution” and not to the area of realpolitik. From the perspective of revolutionary theory, imperialism behaved exactly as was to be expected, i.e. acting to defend its own interests. It was the “revolutionary forces” which should be in charge of circumstances so as to prove themselves stronger than imperialism. Nevertheless, considerations of realpolitik were foremost in the mind of those who took decisions with respect to Chile in Moscow. K. Brutenz, ex-number 2 in the International Department of the CPSU, confesses to having had the feeling that things in Chile would turn out badly, because “they wouldn’t allow it” (this impersonal grammatical form used by Brutenz is symptomatic, when referring to the principal enemy at that time, the USA). But the doctrine which favoured the transition of the whole world to socialism would not allow him to put into words the acceptance of the division of that world into known spheres of influence. Whoever had that “feeling” took care not to express it in the official documents they prepared.

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130 We can mention here the biography of Salvador Allende, written by Y. Lavretski (1976); the book by V. Chernyshov, “Complot de las Momias” (1977) and the piece by G. Borovik “Inconclusive Dialogue” (1974) which refers to an imaginary dialogue between Allende and Che Guevara. The fact remains that the “inconclusive” character of the dialogue, despite being a transgression and in spite of the author’s position as being in favour of Allende’s position, was accepted.


132 Interview with K. Brutenz, Moscow April 1999.
4. READING OF THE SOVIET POSITION MADE BY THE CHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY

The Chilean Communist leaders, accustomed for decades to venerate the words coming from the Soviet Communist Party, especially when these referred to their own country and an evaluation of their activities, followed very attentively the analyses of the Unidad Popular in all the Soviet publications dedicated to it. The fact that the “overseas leadership” of the Chilean Communist Party remained in Moscow during the tears when theses analyses of the defeat of the UP were carried out, allowed it to know even more closely the Soviet material on the subject. The leaders of Chilean communism, very familiar with Soviet internal political structures and procedures, knew how to differentiate between academic documents, which were followed with a desire to acquaint themselves as to the correct party line, and the documents which came from Soviet political structures which could be interpreted as subliminal messages directed towards themselves. How did the Chilean Communist readers then read them?

In the recently published memoirs of Luis Corvalan and Orlando Millas, the subject of Soviet reaction to the Chilean coup is present as far as the opinion of the CPSU or Brezhnev personally is concerned. The vision of the Soviet Latin Americanists is taken into account when it is seen as a manifestation of the official position, and looked at with suspicion when it is felt to contain some transgression. Luis Corvalan puts himself in the forefront of the Chilean Communist Party line of the 80’s - known as the “politics of popular rebellion”, which proclaimed the “right of the people to rebel against tyranny” - and pronounces himself in favour of the use of “all forms of struggle”, which in practice implies the incorporation of armed methods to push the CP into action. To lay the basis of his position, in the chapter of his memoirs dedicated to precisely the absence of any “military policy” on the part of the Communist Party during the Allende years, he refers to what the Chilean CP read as the official Soviet position during the first years after the coup:

“When I went into exile, the opinion of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev was very much in fashion in Moscow as to why Allende’s government had been defeated. “Every revolution has to know how to defend

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itself", the Secretary General of the Soviet Party had said. These words sounded like a clear and simple explanation for our defeat. The Communist leaders who resided there had made them their own. I also made them mine, more or less mechanically, without thinking... later we coined a phrase which became equally famous, that of a “historical vacuum” in the policy of our Party. It consisted of the fact, that having worried, for a great deal of its existence, about the workers, women, the peasants, the young, the intellectuals, and the small and medium size businessmen and having formed and fixed a thinking and a behaviour in relation to each of these social sectors, the Party lacked, nevertheless, a military position. It lacked a policy in this aspect.”

The link which is established between the idea of a “historical vacuum” and the opinion expressed by Brezhnev is symptomatic as is the recognition that these opinions were made his own by the author “mechanically and without thinking”, since they stemmed from the maximum authority of the world political movement to which he belonged. This “historical vacuum” was filled with the preparation of the Communist Party’s own “military cadres”, which, later on, formed the basis of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (the FPMR) and which allowed the CP to put forward themes like “all forms of struggle” (we must remember that the formula “all forms of struggle” in the USSR in relation to Chile appears for the first time in Sobolev’s report during the discussion of 1974) and “popular rebellion”. It is necessary to point out that the concept of a “historical vacuum” goes further than a perception of the need to forcibly fight a military dictatorship: it is interpreted as an historical flaw in the Chilean Communist Party, which must be corrected with the incorporation of military policies, as a permanent and unavoidable element, in spurring the CP to action. For the Chilean CP, to recognise this “historical vacuum” implied at the same time agreeing with the criticisms which Fidel Castro made of its previous policies and brought a close relationship with Cuba, where immediately after the coup the preparation of the military cadres of the Chilean CP began.

Among material which has been declassified up to now we encountered a document of the Central Committee of the CPSU which gives an account of a course of military training of nine months duration, held in the USSR, and given to a group of militants from the Chilean Socialist Party.

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134 L. Corvalan is referring here to the phraseology used in the paragraph regarding Chile in the report of L. Brezhnev to the XXV Congress of the CPSU in 1976. See, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, “XXV Congress of the CPSU”. Documents and Material” (1976)

between 1975 and 1976. The same document makes mention of a request from Carlos Altamirano, in December 1976, that the USSR receive in 1977 a group of militant socialists once again for courses of military training of eleven months duration.\textsuperscript{136} It is worth stating here that inter-party relations between the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, and which included the fact that the latter were in the list of those who benefited from Soviet aid, were established after 1973. The Deputy Head of the International Department of the CC of the CPSU, bringing this request to a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, pointed out that “Comrade Luis Corvalán supports the request of Comrade Carlos Altamirano”. A resolution to this respect was taken at the level of the Secretariat of the CC of the CPSU, accompanied by the signatures of the highest Soviet leaders, including L. Brezhnev, and the Ministry of Defence of the USSR was encharged with carrying it out. (See Appendix B.1, pages 146-148).

What the chilean Socialist Party asked for from the CPSU in those years was support for the clandestine activities of their political teams. And so, in 1978, the Secretary of the CC of the CPSU approved the reception in the USSR of 5 leaders of the Chilean Socialist Party for their “documentation”\textsuperscript{137} and “learning of clandestine methods of work”. The request, which was signed by Luis Corvalan, was registered as part of a plan for “replacing the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party who were working secretly in Chile and Argentina”, for which they also received the approval for receiving in the USSR “3 comrades from countries which have a common border with Chile so as to elaborate a plan with them for the transference of the Chilean Communist leaders”. From that we can conclude that such a plan was also organised in Moscow, with the participation of those “competent organisations” who were entrusted to receive the group of Chilean Communists.\textsuperscript{138} (see Appendix B.2, pages 149-152).

This new line of cooperation between the CPSU and the Chilean CP (and, via its sponsor, with other parties of the Left), destined to prepare the Chilean cadres for “all forms of struggle” appeared after 1973 and changed the composition of the Soviet collaborators of the Chilean Communist Party (who used to be only the unions, newspaper editors and various economic and social organisations of cooperation but now included the military and

\textsuperscript{136} See the documents and resolutions in Appendix B.1, pages 146 to 148

\textsuperscript{137} It seems to refer to the fabrication of false documents with which they would enter Chile. According to A. Sosnovski, who acted as an interpreter in the Central Committee at the end of the 70’s, there was a section in the International Department, inherited from the Comintern, which was dedicated to fabrication of documents and other things for the clandestine activities of the Communist Party.

\textsuperscript{138} See the documents and resolution in Appendix B.2, pages 149-152.
the security services), which was also reflected in the modification of political arguments which the Chileans heard from their Soviet counterparts. Without a doubt, all this contributed to the so-called “militarist turn-about” of the Chilean Communist Party in September 1980. In his memoirs, Luis Corvalan points out that the “argument of the 3rd of September 1980, which invoked the right of rebellion (the same as Corvalan himself had announced in Moscow when deciding on the turnaround in Chilean Communist policies) also had a certain amount of international repercussion. It got coverage in the “Pravda” of Moscow, in the “Granma” of Havana and in the “Nuevo Diario” of Managua. It was reproduced in the magazines “America Latina” of the Institute of Latin America in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the magazine Paz y Socialismo” (Peace and Socialism), which the Communist parties in Prague edited, and the magazine “Estudios” of the Communist Party of Uruguay.”

Orlando Millas’ memoirs take less of an official party line and are more personal. Already ill and with difficulties to write, the author dictated them in the last years of his life, which coincided with the end of “real socialism” and the return to Chile of a democracy via a different path than that proposed by the Chilean Communist Party. Millas intended to give his own vision of the policies of the Chilean CP over the last 25 years, of the USSR and of the reality he personally lived. In a complicated and confusing mixture of criticisms of party dogma and affirmations no less dogmatic and scholarly, from someone who wants to reconcile ancient faith with reform, he tries to present himself as a kind of internal dissent, initially opposed to the “military turnabout” of the Chilean CP, friend of the “Eorocommunists” and a perspicacious observer, who had spotted the ulcers of real socialism a long time ago. Although his writings of that period as well as his memories of the Soviet Latin Americanists with whom he was associated during his life in the USSR (including the present author) cast doubt on these affirmations, the memoirs, published at the beginning of the 1990’s, contain reminiscences which allow one to assess the influence of the “USSR factor” in the political turn about of the Chilean CP so much better. Millas was part of the first “overseas leadership” of the Chilean Communist Party after the coup. In his memoirs, he emphasises the importance of the first meeting of

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139 L. Corvalan “De lo Vivido y lo Peleado. Memorias.” (1997), page 277
the Political Committee of the Chilean CP in exile, which was carried out in Moscow in 1974, and in which Volodia Teteilboim, Gladys Marin, Manuel Cantero and Orlando Millas himself participated. It was in that meeting that the decision to prepare the “military cadres” of the CP in Cuba was approved. According to Millas, the idea of a “historical vacuum” in “not counting on the military forces” of the Chilean Communist Party was originally Fidel’s and “was made theirs by several leaders of the Overseas Coordination Committee, and little by little it began to appear in official texts as a formula that had been assimilated by the Communist Party of Chile”.140

These military cadres of the Chilean CP - among which were many of the children of the old Communist leaders (promoters of the “peaceful road”, unionists and parliamentarians) - motivated by their Cuban instructors, participated at the end of the 70’s in the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua and gained their first military experience there. Counting on them to be in Chile at the beginning of the 1980’s, the Chilean CP undertook the creation of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. To lead it they appointed “cadres” who had been trained in Cuba during the previous decade.

Let us return now to 1974 and the meeting of Political Committee of the Chilean Communist Party in Moscow. According to Millas, “the contents of two articles of Soviet analyses giving critical versions of what happened in Chile” were also under discussion at this same meeting of the Political Committee.141 Millas does not name the authors of these texts only the impact they caused in his party, but judging by the dates, one of them was the “open” article written by A. Sobolev142, based on the afore-mentioned confidential report (which corresponded to the discussions carried out in February 1974), since it was the first Soviet public analysis on the subject and its author was one of the official theoreticians of the CPSU. The placing of the second text is more difficult, since Soviet publications which followed the subject had only appeared as recently as May 1974 and we do not know for sure the exact date of the meeting. Anyway, in our point of view, the publication which most probably caught the attention of the Chilean Communist leaders was the article by V. Volski, Director of the Latin American Institute, “The Problems of the Peaceful Way towards Socialism” (1974) whose opinions were also seen as official ones, given the post he occupied and whose writings Millas criticised in another part of his memoirs.

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141 Ibid., page 189.
142 A. Sobolev “The Experience of Chile and the Problem of Class Struggle” (1974).
What is noteworthy is that a discussion about these Soviet analyses formed part of the agenda of this first meeting of the post-coup Communist leadership. How did they interpret these texts about Chile? Millas says:

“They were unstinting in their praise about Salvador Allende and his government and about the Chilean Communist Party: but they then began to talk bitingly about how we had underlined certain supposed laws in the whole revolutionary process”\(^\text{143}\)

later on, Millas quotes as an example of “the apocalyptic condemnation against the conduct of our Party and President Allende” the following words which appeared in an article by V. Volski, even though Volski makes no mention of the Chilean CP or of Allende: “the renunciation, albeit temporary, of the Socialist perspective, the backing down in respect to the tasks imposed by socialism, the desire to disguise objectives, falsely understood, of maintaining a unity with allies who were not Socialists, all these signify an opportunistic deviation to the Right”.\(^\text{144}\) Millas tries to appear in his memoirs as the only visionary early enough in the Communist Party leadership to oppose the “militarisation” of the Party at the beginning and the criticisms of the “older brother” implicit in this change of tack. The ex-officials of the International Department of the CC of the CPSU and other Soviet ideological organisations, which dealt with the Chilean exiles in Moscow during those years, completely deny, with sincere and profound conviction, this supposed enticement to militarism in Soviet political thinking as well as the least expression of bad feeling or divergence of opinion between themselves and any of the Chilean leaders resident in Moscow.\(^\text{145}\) It is interesting to note that the incorporation of military courses and others on security for the Chilean CP are not perceived as an “enticement to militarism” by the ex-Soviet officials.

In a world of ritualised and hermetic language, we are facing here a case of distinct interpretations of the same theories because of different experiences and sensitivities. In effect, the wounded sensitivity of the exiled leadership of the Chilean CP was looking for an allusion in all the political opinions of its allies in the International Communist Movement as to how the lack of a “forceful” component in the Chilean CP during Allende’s go-

\(^\text{144}\) V. Volski “The Problems of a Peaceful Road to Socialism” (1974), quoted by O. Millas in his Memoirs (see above), pages 248-249
\(^\text{145}\) Interviews with Y. Rybalkin, K. Jachaturov and A. Sosnovski, Moscow 1997-1999. “Everything was very clear to all the Chileans. There was never any discussion or divergence of opinion”, was how the people we interviewed described things.
vernment contributed to its fatal end. Although Soviet opinion in this respect is perfectly ambiguous and ambivalent, the Chilean Communists rescued something from it to confirm their new line and convince them of the fact. In spite of his intentions to extrapolate his vision of 1990 to the past, Millas was undoubtedly part of this process during those years. The theories of R. Arismendi as well as Soviet theoreticians, regarding the presence of a “revolutionary situation of a general character” in Latin America, which only needed to set the straw alight (like the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua and its evaluation in Socialist countries) were also taken as arguments in favour of their new strategy by the Chilean Communists in Moscow. 146

At the same time, with the distancing of relations between the USSR and the most important Communist Parties of the West, the Italian and the French, the argument about the “peaceful road” to revolution, even though it stayed in all the official documents of the CPSU, lost its importance and became, like so many other slogans, mere theory. The old ideological leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, passing over any consideration of political prudence, became led more and more by their feelings.

Russian studies of the war in Afghanistan indicate that the decision to intervene militarily in this Asian country (in December 1979) was based by its supporters in the Politburo on the need to “avoid another Chile”, but this time “on our own frontiers”. 147 This argument was widely used during the first few months of this unpopular war by the “propagandists” of the CPSU in meetings to justify the Soviet military action. It demonstrates that at the level of ideological cliches for internal consumption, the CPSU had come to the end of the 1970’s perceiving the failure of the UP in Chile as a conflict of the Cold War which had been lost, and that maybe it could have been saved by a decision of its participants and allies to “defend themselves”? In other words, what had been lacking was the “force factor”. It needs to be said that this vision was in absolute contrast to the conclusions reached in Latin American studies on the subject.

I. Rybalkin remembers that in a personal interview between L. Corvalán and B. Ponomariov, Head of the International Department and Secretary of the Central Committee, the latter, having finished the official part of the meeting and while saying goodbye to his guest, suddenly shot the ques-

146 We found an advance in this idea in Sobolev’s report in the 1974 discussion in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, confirming a maturity in the objective conditions but an insufficiency in the subjective conditions for revolution in the West. See this being developed in R. Arismendi’s “Lenin, Revolution and Latin America” (1978) and the debate in the magazine “Latin America”, Moscow 1978.

tion at him “Of course, we are against individual terror, but how can you put up with so many years of Pinochet and do nothing about it?” The Latin American advisors, in charge of following and elaborating concrete policies, were left open mouthed at such a comment from the octogenerian Secretary of the CC. His guest, it seems, interpreted this as the official Soviet position in this respect.\textsuperscript{148}

The changes in Soviet theory and international practice at the beginning of the 80’s (intervention in Afghanistan, a hardening in attitudes towards the nuclear counter position with the USA, the increase in numerous “low intensity” conflicts, including those in Central America) strengthened the perception in the Chilean CP of the affinity of its new line with the international policies of the USSR.

According to documents which we have gathered together, from 1980 onwards there were requests for the training of military cadres of the Chilean CP in the USSR. If the 70’s was the decade for militants of the Communist Party to learn to survive underground (and military training was being asked for by the Socialist Party), in 1980 the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU approved a request from the Chilean Communist Party, presented by Luis Corvalan, for the training of 15 militant Chilean Communists in the USSR in “destabilisation activities, including acts of sabotage and commando type operations”.\textsuperscript{149} (See Appendix B.3, pages 153-155). Once again the task was given to the Ministry of Defence of the USSR. Although the USSR never became the principal setting for the training of “military cadres” for Chilean Communism, the acceptance of these requests can be interpreted as having received the full support of the maximum leadership of the USSR for the Chilean Communist Party policy of “popular rebellion”.

Undoubtedly there other internal factors, the frustration of the defeat, the experience itself etc, - all of them decisive in the change of party line in the Chilean CP. The Chilean Communists needed a defined strategy to fight the dictatorship and found it in the formula of “popular rebellion”. Now it was the armed road that was to be the way to finish with the dictatorship and at the same time (and this was very important) bring about the revolution.

Nevertheless the interpretation and reading that the Chilean Communists made of official Soviet analyses of their country reinforced them ideologically, perceiving, as they did from their wounded sensitivity, deeper levels of political judgement in the Soviet ideologues.

\textsuperscript{148} Interview with I. Rybalkin, Moscow 1998
\textsuperscript{149} See the documents and the resolution in Appendix B.3, pages 153-155.
APPENDICES

A) Reports (1973)

A. 1. The Situation in Chile (February 21st 1973) ........................................ pp. 55-58
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* The documents were obtained from the Archives of the Ministry of Overseas Relations of the USSR and from the Centre for the Conversion of Contemporary Documents (TsJD) in Moscow, the ex-Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, by Olga Ulianova and Eugenia Fediakova. The Spanish translation is by Eugenia Fediakova.
A.1: The Situation in Chile

February 21st 1973
From: O. Grek, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

The opposition to the government is hoping that the crisis in the lack of supplies which the country is experiencing will lead to the defeat of the Popular Front government of Salvador Allende in the future parliamentary elections of March this year.

Perhaps the Unidad Popular government understood the danger that threatened the country from the grave crisis of supply failure a little too late. Only a month and a half before the parliamentary elections which had to take place at the beginning of March this year, Allende warned his comrades by telling them “Comrades, we only have minutes at our disposal”. 4.5 millions of Chileans are going to participate in the elections for the Chamber of Representatives and half of the Senate, 880,000 of whom are young people. The Senator for the Communist Party, Volodia Teitelboim, who is a candidate for the city of Santiago, is not exaggerating when he says “we are talking about the fate of the revolution”, of this difficult experiment of Allende, the objective of which is to try and bring Chile “on to the road towards Socialism” in a framework of bourgeois conditions and a capitalist economy. “One of the key aspects of the actual struggle for power is the supply problem”, declared the Chilean Finance Minister, Fernando Flores.

After the failure of the petty bourgeoisie to bring the country to its knees in November 1972, the opposition deliberately converted the principal subject of the elections into a crisis: according to the central organ of the opposition, the conservative newspaper El Mercurio, “if the lack of food and the black market continue, the Marxist parties will inevitably suffer losses in the elections”. Privately the opposition is also hoping that the parties that make up the Unidad Popular coalition, which have 36% of the seats, will get less than a third of the votes: in the new composition of the Congress where the opposition could have up to two thirds of the votes, it might then be possible to carry a vote of impeachment against the President, who is actually in power only until 1976. Even if the Popular Front of
the country manages to keep the amount of seats that they actually now have, Allende’s opponents will present the results as a kind of plebiscite directed against the President’s policies. According to the ex-leader of the Christian Democrats, Eduardo Frei, these elections are considered as the “most important of the century”. Even Socialists such as the General Secretary of Allende’s own party, Carlos Altamirano, fear that the Popular Front might lose the women’s vote, as they are the ones that feel the lack of essential consumer goods the most, together with the fact of having to queue and having to walk from shop to shop only to hear the words “Out of stock”.

Given the conditions of an acute shortage of consumer goods, it seems very doubtful that the government is going to continue to capture that half of the population which supported it in the local elections of April 1971 (i.e. approximately half a year after Allende became President). At that time the Unidad Popular government had great popularity because it had raised the buying power of the population considerably, after increasing salaries by almost 66%. Social progress, achieved within the conditions of conserving the framework of the capitalist system, almost inevitably had to run into conflicts. Thanks to the industrial potential which had not been used, demand in 1971 managed to increase. Growth in production that year increased to 12%. Moreover in 1971 the government brought 261 million dollars (US) worth of food products into the country, 120 million dollars more than in 1970. However, at the same time the imports for heavy industry (machinery and manufacturing equipment) were reduced by 16.8%. The phantom of nationalisation became the reason why investment fell by 4.2%. From June 1971 to May 1972 production in the construction sector fell by a third. In September 1972 private savings were 28% less than in December 1971 (taking into consideration inflation). The money that was not invested overheated still more the explosion in demand, while the supply of products diminished. The previous year the volume of agricultural production was reduced by 8%, since, on the one hand the average farmer did not want to work the land as it should be worked, fearing a possible reduction in the minimum area of private farms from 80 hectares to 40 and, on the other, because of irregularities in the supply of agricultural produce, due to the nationalisation of the larger farms through the Agrarian Reform law. In 1,700 of the agricultural businesses surveyed, which were created out of nationalised areas, the peasants (who were sometimes untrained technically) use scarcely three quarters of the land. Moreover, as a result of the fall in copper prices by 25% in 1970, the country was deprived of foreign currency to the tune of almost 500 million dollars (US) during the last two years.
According to the President, the country cannot get hold of a single dollar anywhere.

As a consequence of the reduction in imports of raw materials, none of the 150 businesses which were nationalised have resulted profitable. Productivity has also been reduced owing to the government’s efforts to eliminate unemployment, whatever the cost. During the past year, the Ministry of Finance was forced to subsidise nationalised businesses by 40 thousand million escudos. If the budget deficit grows 40 thousand million more, the government can only cover the costs of carrying out the transformations they want to do by printing more money. And yet already in 1972 Chile had one of the highest inflation rates in the world - 163%. Inflation favours speculation and the black market. This (and not the weakness of supply) is the principal cause of a sharpening of the supply crisis, since according to existing data, half of all consumer goods disappear in the murky channels of the black market. The government is finding it practically impossible to stop the speculators. A little while before the opposition obstructed the approval of a law which would have called for punishment for “economic crimes”. The Socialist publication “Ultima Hora” put forward the following analysis of the voting for the proposed law: “The black market has made itself into the political and economic instrument preferred by the opposition”. An army of around 30,000 speculators supplies its clients with money which is impossible to find in the official commercial system of the country. The bourgeoisie of the “barrio alto” (the rich suburbs) of the capital buy the food they lack delivered to their house at 400% to 500% prices higher than the official ones. In the opposition newspaper, El Mercurio, commercial advertisements for televisions, fridges, tyres and even cement are openly published. Speculators get hold of the merchandise to resell it later at highly elevated prices, even to the public sector. According to statistical data from the Department of Agrarian Reform, from May 1971 to April 1972, 1,879 businesses formed as a result of agrarian reform sold only 14.1% of their produce to the state retail trade. Every day the newspapers of the parties supporting the Popular Front publish information about cases of confiscation of surplus produce to speculators and profiteers. The petty bourgeoisie have gone even further into opposition after Allende’s government took measures to end the supply crisis through a mechanism which would guarantee an equal distribution of consumer goods. Naturally, we are not talking here about the creation of a ration system or something similar. Quite simply the government is intending to guarantee that each citizen has the right to acquire, in the first stage, 10 categories of consumer goods, and later on 30. According to government plans, the viability of the system has
to be guaranteed by an organ composed of five senior officials. However, even the Communist Party Senator, Volodia Teitelboim, is not sure that these measures will have any result before the elections. As there is no system of house registration in Chile, not even the recently created Secretariat for the distribution of consumer goods has the statistical data necessary to plan the distribution of foodstuffs. On top of this, the government at this moment only partially controls agricultural and industrial production, sales and transport and according to its own data, only 30% of the retail trade. The Right is offering a strong resistance to the measures of the government directed to controlling the chaos. The Christian Democrat opposition, on a promise to improve the supply problem, has unchained a campaign hunting for votes. This is confirmed by the fact that in one of the editorials in its last issues El Mercurio revealed the plans of the Christian Democrats, by making this hypocritical declaration: “In March we only have to organise the elections and then afterwards our objective will be the rebirth of the country (i.e. capitalism), of its freedom (i.e. the freedom of activity of foreign monopolies) and of its creative forces (i.e. the upper and middle class)”. Even the President himself is of the opinion that in the case of the opposition not getting a two thirds majority in Congress, “within 48 hours after the elections a political storm will be unleashed in the country”

Soviet UN representative official at Geneva, O. Grek.
A.2 Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Chile

1973: March 16th
From: The Department of Latin American Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 028, Carp. 12, D7

Resultados de las elecciones parlamentarias en Chile

On the 4th of March 1973 elections for the national Congress took place in Chile, during which 150 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and half of the Senate (25 seats) were completely replaced. The Chamber of Deputies is elected for 4 years: the Senate for 8 years with a renewal of 50% of the seats every 4 years.

The parties of the Left which were part of the Unidad Popular bloc (the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Radical Party, the Movement for United Popular Action, the Independent Popular Action, and the Christian Left) formed a federation and entered the elections with a common political programme which talked about carrying out an economic and social transformation. The forces of the Left were opposed by the Opposition Front called the Democratic Confederation (the Christian Democrats, the National Party, the Party of Radical Democracy, radicals from the Left and the National-Democratic Party) which, in reality, had no electoral programme and were united only in their desire to defeat the Unidad Popular and get it out of power. The elections were carried out in very unfavourable conditions for the Left. The Chilean reaction, making use of the difficulties that they themselves had created in the supply of food and industrial products to the population, unleashed a campaign of lies and hatred against the UP government, trying to discredit and slander its activities and the economic and social transformations it was carrying out in Chile. The Communist Party which was consistently defending the need to consolidate the coalition of the Left and a strict carrying out of the UP programme, came under especially violent attack. The parliamentary elections in Chile have reflected the new correlation of political forces within the Unidad Popular government and the opposition.
The UP bloc received the support of 1,589,000 voters (43.85%). This increased its vote, in comparison to the Presidential elections of 1970, by half a million which signifies an important triumph for the Unidad Popular. The grouping of opposition parties was supported by 2 million of the electorate (54.7%) but did not manage to reach its objective of getting two thirds of the seats in the Parliament. The opposition plans of using Parliament in a so called “peaceful coup” and getting rid of the government peacefully “constitutionally” had therefore failed.

After the elections the Chamber of Deputies was made up of 150 members of Parliament. The parties which form the UP bloc have increased their number of members to 63 (they had 57 before), among them 23 Communists (previously there had been 22), 28 Socialists (previously 14), 5 Radicals (previously 12), 1 from the Christian Left (previously 9), plus two representatives from MAPU and two from API, parties which had not been represented before in the Chamber of Deputies. The opposition has gone down from 93 seats to 87. As before, the principal parties of the opposition are the Christian Democrats (with 47 members) and the National Party (with 32). In the new composition of the Senate (50 members) after the elections, the Leftist bloc will have 20 senators (where before they had 18), including 9 from the Communist Party (previously having had 6) and 7 from the Socialist Party, which had had 5 before.

The opposition has 30 seats, 19 of which belong to the Christian Democrats and 8 to the National Party. In this way, as a result of the elections in Chile, there is a politically unstable balance between the coalition of the government and the opposition grouping. The Left, thanks to the work of the Communist Party, have managed to restrain the negative tendency of the population from distancing themselves from supporting the government owing to economic and food problems. The influence of the Leftist coalition in the working class, the peasants and the middle sector of the population has been consolidated. However, as the situation is at present, the Left cannot change the correlation of forces in the Congress in its favour. The opposition, in spite of having lost various seats, continues to have a majority in Congress but still lacks the forces and the Constitutional means (two thirds of the vote in Congress) to get rid of Allende’s government.

The general political perspective of a consolidation of power in the hands of the Left depends on the consolidation of the forces of the Left, their overcoming of the economic difficulties, attracting the masses and the patriotic sectors of the population to their side and of the organisational
and political work of all the parties which make up the UP to expose and isolate the opposition parties of the Right.

Department of Latin American Countries
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
A.3 Regarding the situation in Chile

1973: July 16th
From: the Department of Latin American Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, F139, Carp. 12, D7

Regarding the situation in Chile

The internal political situation in Chile has worsened seriously of late and continues being extremely tense. The basis for this is the activisation of political opposition forces to the government, which, utilising the economic difficulties that the country is going through and the fact that the UP has no definitive programme for overcoming them, is trying to strengthen its loss of prestige, by dividing the people, attracting the Chilean army to its side and unleashing a civil war on the country.

Some examples of this new wave of anti-government activity by the opposition were the strike in one of the country’s most important businesses, the El Teniente copper mine, the attack on the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Prats, who was favourable to the government, and the attempted coup at the end of June. President Allende and the leadership of one of the main parties of the Unidad Popular, the Chilean Communist Party, saw the long term answer to this situation as being the formation of a civilian-military government. Nevertheless, they later had to reject the idea as it was feared that the involvement of the military in the political life of the country, which was against the traditional role of the Chilean Army, could lead to new attacks on the government by the opposition and discontent in the higher circles of the military. On the 5th of July this year the composition of a new civil cabinet was announced and a so-called “emergency plan” announced. The plan called for a strengthening of national security and the political authority of the government, the introduction of a strict regime of austerity and discipline, a fight against inflation and the “black market”, a consolidation of state control of the supply system and a guarantee to supply the people with basic foodstuffs, an increase in the public sector in industry and in developing agrarian reform, and an extension of worker participation in administration and of the role of mass organisations etc. The objective behind the formation of a new cabinet and the publication of its programme is to keep the masses calm, give them a certain respite, and gain time for putting the Army and the country in order.
It is impossible not to underline the fact that this “emergency plan” of the government is a general and not a specific one: there are no clearly formulated measures for organising an increase in industrial and agrarian production, where the tendencies for crisis are the most obvious. We also cannot fail to mention that the government is also awarding a secondary role for carrying out such an imprecise plan. The main attention of the political circles of the Left and of the leadership of one of the main parties of the UP, the Socialist Party, is centred on the problems of preparing for an armed conflict, which they consider to be inevitable. The worsening of the difficulties in the country can be put down to a great extent to the extremist tendencies of the Socialists who are categorically against any contact or even dialogue with democratic sectors of the opposition. Contrary to the line which the President and the Chilean Communist Party have taken, which is directed to preserving the professional character of the Armed Forces (protection by a constitutional government) the leadership of the Chilean Socialist Party has declared energetically in favour of involving the Army in the revolutionary process and called upon it openly to arm the people. The opposition is using these extremist slogans of the Chilean SP to fight against the government and get the support of the Armed Forces against the UP. The unity of action of the party leaders of the Left with respect to the Army and the opposition, as well as the drawing up of a precise programme for overcoming economic difficulties, continue to be the most decisive factors for stabilising the political situation in the country. If the contrary happens, the possibility of an acute worsening in the political situation of the country cannot be excluded, even including the possibility of an armed confrontation with the forces of the opposition.

Department of Latin American Countries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.
B.1 **Subject:** Regarding the course on military training in the USSR for a group of representatives from the Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh) during 1975 and 1976 and a new course for 15 representatives of the PSCh in 1977

1976: December 29th  
From: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR  
Archive: TsJD, F89, O27, D6

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The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR

Subject on the agenda for the International Department of the CC of the CPSU

From 1975 to 1976 a group of representatives from the Socialist Party of Chile *carried out a 9 month course of military training*\(^1\) which, according to the leadership of the Chilean Socialist Party, allowed them to considerably improve the work of the Party in that area. Because of this, the Secretary General of the Socialist Party, Comrade C. Altamirano, has written to ask (see letter attached) that a new group of representatives from the PSCh, *15 persons in total*, be received in the USSR *with the object of receiving a course of military training over a period of 11 months.*

We consider it possible to satisfy Comrade C. Altamirano’s request and receive a group of *15 representatives* from the PSCh in the USSR in 1977 *with the object of carrying out a military training course of 11 months.* It would be possible to put the Ministry of Defence of the USSR in charge of their reception, their supplies, the *organisation of the courses* and the payment of tickets for the group from *Santiago* to Moscow and back. The subject has been agreed with the Ministry of Defence of the USSR (Comrade Kulikov). Comrade L. Corvalan supports the petition of Comrade C. Altamirano.

I attach the project for the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Vice-Director of the International Department of the V. Shaposhnikov Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

December 29th 1976

No. 25-C-2395

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\(^1\) From here onwards the words in black print are those which have been hand written in the original (translator)
During the conversations with officials of the International Department of the Central Committee of Communist Party of the USSR, Comrade C. Altamirano expressed his tremendous gratitude to the Communist Party of the USSR for the loaning of aid to train the cadres and asked that the USSR receive in 1977 a group of representatives from the Chilean Socialist Party, 15 in number, with the object of carrying out a course of military training lasting 11 months.

Official of the International Department of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

August 30th 1976
Decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Regarding the subject on the agenda for the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR

1. To satisfy the petition of the Secretary General of the Socialist Party of Chile, Comrade Carlos Altamirano, and receive a group of representatives of the PSCh in the USSR in 1977, **15 persons in number to carry out a course of military training over an 11 month period.**

2. The reception, supplies, *organisation of courses* and the payment of tickets for the group from *Santiago* to Moscow and back shall be the responsibility of *the Ministry of Defence of the USSR.*
B.2: Regarding assistance from the USSR in the replacing of leaders of the Chilean Communist Party who are carrying out clandestine activities in Chile and Argentina and training in clandestine work.

1978: October 16th
From: Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR

Archive: TsJD, F89, O27, D35, pages 1-8.

Absolutely Confidential

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR

Regarding the request from the leadership of the Communist Party in Chile

The Secretary General of the Communist Party of Chile, Comrade Luis Corvalán, has asked the Central committee of the Communist Party of the USSR (see attached document) to lend its assistance in carrying out a plan for the replacement of leaders of the Chilean Communist Party who are working clandestinely in Chile and Argentina by comrades who are in Europe. In accordance with this plan, the idea is that three comrades would travel from Chile to Europe, among them members of the Political Commission of the Central Committee of the Chilean Communist Party, Comrade......1 (in December this year), and Comrade..............2 (in May next year) and two comrades from Argentina, including a candidate for the Political Commission of the Central Committee of the Chilean Communist Party............3 (in October the same year). In their places would be sent other members of the leadership of the Party, among them members of the Political Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chile, Comrades J. Inunza and V. Cantero4. Comrade L. Corvalán is asking that the costs to carry out these replacements be covered, as well as the costs of delivering the necessary personal documents. At the same time, Comrade Corvalán expressed his wish that the members of the clandestine leadership of the Party, Comrades J. Texier and......................5, who arrived in Moscow to participate in the meeting of the Directive Committee of the Chilean Communist

1 Surname illegible (translator)
2 Surname appears to be practically illegible (translator)
3 Surname illegible (translator)
4 Words in black print are those which have been hand written in the original (translator)
5 Surname illegible (translator)
Party (and who are returning to Chile) as well as Comrade .......................\(^6\)
(who is returning to Argentina) *be given the personal documentation that is necessary.*

We consider it advisable to satisfy Comrade Corvalan’s request and entrust the implementation of it to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR in conjunction with the Committee of State Security of the USSR, charging all the costs incurred to the Party’s budget (including the costs in foreign currency to the tune of up to 25,000 for the payment of fares, clothes, documents etc). Comrade L. Corvalan’s wishes with regard to the Comrades J. Texier and ..................\(^7\)
who are in Moscow in accordance with the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR hitherto agreed, will also be carried out.

The project has now been agreed with the Committee of State Security of the USSR (Comrade Tsvigun).

The decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR regarding this project is attached.

Deputy- Director of the International Department of the CC of the CPSU

K. Brutenz

October 16th 1978

No.25-C-2001

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\(^6\) Surname illegible (translator)

\(^7\) Surname illegible (translator)
Absolutely Confidential

Information regarding the approximate costs in foreign currency based on the request from the leadership of the Communist Party of Chile

1. Payment of tickets for three comrades who are leaving Chile and for another three who will be replacing them.  
   1,300 roubles * 6 = 7,800 roubles

2. Payment of tickets for two comrades who are leaving Argentina and for another two who are replacing them  
   1,200 roubles * 4 = 4,800 roubles

3. Payment of tickets for six comrades who are accompanying the representatives of the leadership of the Communist Party of Chile during their journey from Santiago to Buenos Aires (or Lima) and back  
   200 roubles * 6 = 1,200 roubles

4. Payment of return tickets to Moscow for three comrades of countries bordering on Chile who are travelling to carry out the plan to transfer the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party  
   2,400 roubles * 3 = 7,200 roubles

5. Equipment for the Chilean comrades who are being sent into the country  
   800 roubles * 5 = 4,000 roubles

TOTAL 25,000 roubles in foreign currency
Decision of the Secretariat of the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding the request from the leadership of the Communist Party of Chile

1. To agree to the request of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Chile, Comrade Luis Corvalan, and in 1978 and 1979 lend assistance for the realisation of the plan to replace the leaders of the Chilean CP who have been working secretly in Chile and Argentina.

2. To receive five Chilean comrades in the USSR between 1978 and 1979 for up to two months so as to prepare their documentation\(^1\) and to instruct them in clandestine work, and to receive three comrades from countries bordering Chile for a period of up to two weeks and, with their participation, to draw up the plan for transferring the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party.

   To entrust the reception of the afore mentioned comrades and any services they may require to the International Department and the Internal Affairs Directorate of the CC of the CPSU, the work of preparing their documentation to the International Department of the CC of the CPSU and their instruction and help in the documentation to the Committee of State Security of the USSR.

   To let the Chilean comrades stay in apartments belonging to the Directorate of Internal Affairs of the CC of the CPSU.

3. The costs of the tickets for the Chilean comrades, their stay in the USSR and any other costs associated with the lending of aid in replacing the leaders of the Communist Party of Chile who have been working in that country and in Argentina, are to be put against the budget of the Communist Party of the USSR.

4. Between 1978 and 1979 the Ministry of Finance has to pass over 25 thousand roubles in foreign currency to the Directorate of Internal Affairs of the Central Committee of the CPSU to cover the costs associated with the request from the leadership of the Communist Party of Chile.

Signed K. Brutenz

Sent to Comrades Andropov, Ponomarev and Pavlov.

Point Number 4 sent to Comrade Garbuzov V. F.

\(^1\) Here and from now on the words in black print are those that have been hand written in the original.
B.3: Regarding the request of Luis Corvalan for a course of special training (in sabotage) for 15 representatives of the Chilean Communist Party.

October 30th 1980
From: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR

File: TsJD, F89, O43, D9 pages 1-3.

Absolutely Confidential

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR.

Regarding the request from the leadership of the Communist Party of Chile

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of Chile (ChCP), Comrade L. Corvalan, has written to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR (copy attached) with a request that the USSR receives 15 activists from the Chilean CP (three groups of five people) in 1981 with the objective of carrying out a course of special training (in placing mines and explosives for acts of sabotage), and paying their fares from Chile or any other country where they might be staying to Moscow and then from Moscow back to Chile. Comrade L. Corvalan puts forward the case for his request as being the fact that the development of the internal situation in his country requires the Party to dominate all forms of struggle and, to carry this out, special cadres must be trained.

We consider it possible to meet the request from the leadership of the Chilean Communist Party. It should be possible to entrust the reception, instruction and payment of fares of the Chilean comrades to the Ministry of Defence of the USSR. The subject has been agreed with the Deputy Director of the Principal Directorate of Investigations of the Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Comrade A.G. Pavlova.

We attach a copy of the decision regarding the project from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Deputy Director of the International Department of the CC of the CPSU
K. Brutenz

October 30th 1980
No. 18-C
To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Dear Comrades¹,

With the objective of dominating the different forms of struggle, we are writing to you to request training for fifteen of our comrades in “destabilisation” techniques, including acts of sabotage and “commando” operations.

Because of the above, we are asking you to receive three groups of our comrades, with five persons per group, for training from January 1981, paying their return fares to and from the USSR. It is believed that ten of the comrades will arrive from Chile and the rest from other countries.

Knowing, as we do, your immovable internationalist position and spirit of solidarity, we hope that this request will be favoured with a positive answer.

With my most fraternal and cordial greetings

Luis Corvalan
General Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party

Moscow October 17th 1980

(Translation from Spanish into Russian by I. Rybalkin)

¹ Original in Russian written entirely by hand.
Decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding the request
from the Communist Party of Chile

1. To agree to the request from the leadership of the Communist Party
of Chile and receive 15 representatives of the Chilean Communist
Party in the USSR in 1981 to carry out a special training course
(laying mines and explosives and undertaking acts of sabotage) for
a period of up to six months.

2. To entrust the Ministry of Defence of the USSR with the reception,
material supplies, services and instruction of the Chilean comrades,
as well as the payment of their fares (including expenses in foreign
currency) from Chil or any other country where they might be sta-
ying, to Moscow and back from Moscow to Chile.

Sent to Comrades Ustinov, Ponomarev, Suslov.

December 29th 1976
From: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR

File: TsJD, F89, O27, D6
ЗАПИСЬ
беседы с Генеральным секретарем
Социалистической партии Чили т. К. Альтамирано

В беседе с работниками Международного отдела ЦК КПСС
т. К. Альтамирано выразил большую благодарность КПСС за оказание
помощи в подготовке кадров партии и обратился с просьбой принять
в 1977 г. в СССР группу представителей СПЧ в составе
15 человек для прохождения военной подготовки
сроком на 11 месяцев.

Референт Международного отдела
ЦК КПСС

"30" августа 1976 года
ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ
Секретариата ЦК Коммунистической Партии Советского Союза

Вопрос: Международного отдела ЦК КПСС

1. Удовлетворить просьбу Генерального секретаря Социалистической партии Чили т. К. Алламирано о приеме в 1977 г. в СССР группы представителей СПЧ в составе 15 человек для пребывания в военной подготовки сроком на 11 месяцев.

2. Прием, материальное обеспечение, организацию учебы и оплату проезда группы от Санкт-Петербурга до Москвы и обратно возложить на Министерство обороны СССР.

Результаты исполнения:

Вынесен тт. Хасанову Гамиру.

(Подпись)

[Signature]

[Date: 11.12.76, X. Shurukov]
B.2: Agenda: Regarding the assistance of the USSR to replace the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party who are carrying out clandestine operations in Chile and Argentina and training in clandestine work.

October 16th 1978
From: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR

File: TsJD, F89, O27, D35 pages 1-8
совместно с Комитетом государственной безопасности СССР, относились связанные с этими расходы (в том числе расходы в инвалите до 25 тыс. рублей на оплату проезда, экипировку и др.) за счет партийного бюджета. Пожелание т. Л. Корвалана относительно тт. , находящихся в Москве в соответствии с ранее принятыми постановлениями ЦК КПСС, будет выполнено в рабочем порядке.

С Комитетом госбезопасности СССР (т. Цзигуном ) вопрос согласован.

Проект постановления ЦК КПСС прилагается.

Зам. зав. Международным отделом ЦК КПСС (М. Ерутенц)

"iки" октября 1978 года

\[25-С-2001\]
(B.2: Document Attached: Expenses derived from the request of the Chilean Communist Party)

С П Р А В К А
о примерных расходах в инвалите, связанных с просьбой руководства Компартании Чили

1. Оплата проезда трех товарищей, въезжающих из Чили, и трех, направляемых им на замену

   1300 руб. х 6 = 7800 руб.

2. Оплата проезда двух товарищей, въезжающих из Аргентины, и двух, направляемых им на замену

   1200 руб. х 4 = 4800 руб.

3. Оплата проезда одного товарища, сопровождающего представителей руководства Компартании Чили при проезде от Сантъяго до Буэнос-Айреса (Лима) или обратно

   200 руб. х 6 = 1200 руб.

4. Оплата проезда в Москву и обратно

   3 товарищей из пограничных с Чили стран для разработки плана переброски руководящих деятелей Компартании Чили

   2400 руб. х 3 = 7200 руб.

5. Экипировка чилийских товарищей, направленных в страну

   800 руб. х 5 = 4000 руб.

Итого: 25000 инв. рус
(B.2: Decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ
Секретариата ЦК Коммунистической Партии Советского Союза

В преддверье руководства Компартии Чили

1. Удовлетворить просьбу Генерального секретаря Коммунистической партии Чили т. Л. Корвалана и оказать содействие в осуществлении в 1978-1979 гг. плана замены руководящих деятелей КПЧ, нелегально работающих в стране и в Аргентине.

2. Принять в СССР в 1978-1979 гг. 5 чилийских товарищей на срок до двух месяцев для их интернатуры и обучения методам коммунистической работы и 2 товарищей из пограничных с Чили стран на срок до двух недель для разработки плана переброски руководителей КПЧ.

Прием и обслуживание указанных товарищей возложить на Международный отдел и Управление делами ЦК КПСС, работу по их документам.

(См. продолжение)
Предусмотреть размещение чилийских товарищей на квартирах Управления делами ЦК КПСС.

3. Расходы по проезду, пребыванию в СССР чилийских товарищей и другие расходы, связанные с оказанием содействия в осуществлении замены руководящих деятелей Компартии Чили, работающих в стране и в Аргентине, отнести за счет партбюджета.

4. Министерству финансов СССР выделить Управлению делами ЦК КПСС в 1978-1979 гг. до 25 тыс. рублей в инвентаре на расходы, связанные с выполнением просьбы руководства Компартии Чили.
B.3: Agenda: Regarding the request of Luis Corvalan for a special training course (in sabotage) for 15 representatives of the Chilean Communist Party.

October 30th 1980
From: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR

File: TsJD, F89, O43, D9, pages 1-3
В Центральный комитет
Коммунистической партии Советского Союза
Дорогие товарищи!

В целях отработки руководящих формул, которые мы объединим с
вами с помощью о подготовке, а затем -
находим все наиболее важные
товарищей по
теме "деятельность группы"
встречи
демонстрации объединения и отправляем
группу "коммодос".

Мы просим вас с этим начать не
позднее 31 января 1981 года,
т.е. группу с помощью товарищей,
по пяти человек команды, определив
шесть группу "Советского Союза"
которые имеют 10 товаров
помогают
мне
на 5 из других
отправляя.

Зная вашу неизменную широкую
нации, мы надеемся, что наши товарищи,
встречные в мире
вопросы, которые мы хотели
бы
самих фруктов
с
приветом,

Луис Корвалан
Генеральный секретарь КПИ
Москва, 17 октября 1980 года

Перевод с испанского
(B.3: Decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ
Секретарят ЦК Коммунистической Партии Советского Союза

О просьбе руководства Компартии Чили

1. Удовлетворить просьбу руководства Коммунистической партии Чили и принять в СССР в 1981 году на срок до шести месяцев для прохождения специальной подготовки (штатно-обучение, 
совершение факультативных акций) 18 представителей КПЧ.

2. Прием и обслуживание, материальное обеспечение и обучение 
чилейских товарищей, а также оплату их проезда (включая расходы 
в инвалуте) от Чили или другой страны пребывания до г. Москвы 
и от г. Москвы до Чили возложить на Министерство обо́рны СССР.

Результаты голосования:

Винник тт. [подпись]
50. Э. Jugend

Расшифровка: от 1981г. и îнвалута.
Libros y artículos

——— La Rebelión Popular se Abre Camino en Chile. S.I. 1981.


Documentos


### Nómina de entrevistados y lugar y fecha de entrevistas


Maidanik, Kiva. Investigador del Instituto de Economía Mundial y Relaciones Internacionales de la Academia de Ciencias de Rusia, autor de múltiples publicaciones e informes sobre América Latina.


Semionov, Serguei. Investigador del Instituto de América Latina, ex profesor del Instituto de Ciencias Sociales del CC del PCUS, autor de numerosas publicaciones e informes sobre América Latina.


