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## STUDY

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### **FROM DEMOCRACY TO DEMOCRACY: CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES OF ELECTORAL CHOICES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN CHILE**

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After almost seventeen years of authoritarian rule with no regular national elections, Chileans have once again expressed themselves in the polls. The central question addressed in this paper is the extent to which there are continuities in the current elections with the past choices of the voters.

This question is examined by comparing current vote totals by party and by tendency with those of the past, and by correlating the votes in the elections of 1969, 1970, 1973, with the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 presidential and parliamentary elections. The results show that there is a remarkable consistency of electoral choices in the country, which is still divided into left, center and right tendencies. And yet there have been changes. New party labels have emerged, and the party system is currently much more centripetal than it was in the past, given a significant degree of consensus among the main

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political forces over the value of democracy as well as over fundamental socio-economic policies. Whether these changes will prove to be long lasting in the face of renewed electoral competition over the next years is still an open question.

One of the fascinating questions raised by cases of democratic transition is the extent to which the electorate's historic political divisions and allegiances reemerge. This question is particularly significant since virtually every authoritarian regime hopes to change the population's opinions and values through social, educational, political, and economic reforms in ways that will minimize support for those sectors the regime views as its enemies. And yet, the overriding finding from many different transitional settings is that electoral choices have a remarkable continuity, even though party labels, leaders, and specific programs may change. For instance, even after four decades of Francisco Franco's authoritarian regime in Spain, the first parliamentary elections revealed what Juan Linz noted as the "impressive continuities in the areas of strength of parties and between certain of the newly created [parties] and those of the past."<sup>1</sup> This conclusion is warranted by the high correlations between the 1936 and the 1977 votes for the Communist Party (.68) and the Socialist Worker's Party (.54), as well as those between the 1936 vote for the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas and the 1977 votes for Unión de Centro Democrático (.46) and Acción Popular (.35).<sup>2</sup>

The Chilean electorate from the presidential election of 1925 to the breakdown of democracy in 1973 showed a remarkably consistent division around a right, a center and a left tendency, each of which obtained (exceptions aside) between about a quarter and a little more than a third of the total vote. The military regime of General Augusto Pinochet made a concerted attempt to change the attitudes of Chileans in ways that would minimize support for the left. To this end, it undertook a series of "modernizations" which put an emphasis on strengthening private initiative

<sup>1</sup> Juan Linz, "The New Spanish Party System," in Richard Rose, ed., *Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 104. Linz' article notes that there were many other discontinuities between the parties and the party systems of the 1930s and the late 1970s.

<sup>2</sup> Linz, p. 103, Table 1. The Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas was the main umbrella organization of centrist to rightist parties and groups opposed to the dominant parties in the Second Republic. The Unión de Centro Democrático was the party precariously put together from many disparate centrist to rightist groups by Adolfo Suárez, that later self-destructed through internicine conflicts. And Acción Popular is currently the main partisan expression of the Spanish right.

and the role of markets while decreasing the size and importance of the state in the economy and society. It also attempted to alter party divisions by subjecting parties to new legal requirements, and by radically changing the electoral law to favor bi-polar competition to the detriment of the weakest one of the three tendencies —i. e., the left. However, there was little chance the Chilean authoritarian regime would succeed in these attempts any more than other such regimes. This is especially the case given the long history of democratic government in Chile that had established strong political memories and allegiances, and the extensive rooting in society of its political divisions around religious and class cleavages.<sup>3</sup>

In this paper, we discuss the significant continuities in electoral choices that have indeed manifested themselves in Chile since its transition to democracy. Our principal evidence comes from correlations of the votes cast in 1988 and 1989 with those of 1969, 1970 and 1973. The votes in 1988 were cast in the October 5 plebiscite that put an end to Pinochet's rule, while those of 1989 correspond to the presidential and congressional elections held on December 11, 1989 that led to President Patricio Aylwin's government and to the reopening of the national Congress after its sixteen and a half year closure. The 1969 and 1973 elections were congressional ones, while the 1970 election was a presidential contest. The correlations are based on the electoral results by commune, the smallest political-administrative unit in the country. Given the fact that the military government increased the number and, in many cases, the borders of the communes, the recent electoral data had to be adapted to fit that of the previous elections following procedures that are explained in the appendix. These procedures resulted in a small reduction in the number of communes in the earlier data set from 287 to 254, but yielded a data set for the current period that is fully compatible with that of the earlier years. While our stress here is on the continuities of electoral choices, we will also point out some of the significant changes that are seemingly underway in the Chilean party system, discussion with which we begin.

<sup>3</sup> This point was a central prediction in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Party Oppositions to the Chilean Military Regime," in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), first published as "Partidos de Oposición bajo el Régimen Autoritario Chileno," in *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, vol. 44, # 2 (April-June 1982), pp. 599-648, where the military government's attempt to change Chile's political attachments is discussed. For a historical analysis of the evolution of the Chilean party system and the role of generative cleavages, see Timothy Scully, *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Chile* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), and J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratización vía reforma: la extensión del sufragio en Chile* (Buenos Aires: IDES, 1986).

### The Chilean Party System, Past and Present

Chilean party politics from the mid 1930's to the breakdown of democracy in 1973 had been characterized not only by its division into a right, a center and a left segment, but also for having a multi-party system. Although there were at times up to thirty parties, there have usually been no more than five or six important parties, usually two per tendency, the others being relatively short-lived splinter groups or small parties organized by well known figures. There were two important parties on the right with roots in the mid-nineteenth century, the Liberals and the Conservatives. They merged in 1967 (along with a smaller group) to form what became the National Party (Partido Nacional, PN).<sup>4</sup> The center was held from the second decade of the twentieth century primarily by the Radical Party (Partido Radical, PR), whose roots can also be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century. It was displaced in the early 1960s as the most important party of the center by the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC), whose roots date back to incipient Catholic Action groups in the 1930s. The principal parties of the left have been the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista de Chile, PS), although it has divided frequently generating one or more additional Socialist parties, and the Communist Party (Partido Comunista, PC). Given its multipartism and its ideological divisions running the full extent of the political spectrum, the Chilean party system at times approximated quite closely what Giovanni Sartori has called an extremely polarized party system.<sup>5</sup> By the 1960s and early 70s, electoral campaigns generated centrifugal tendencies in the programmatic positions espoused by the various parties as the left and right extremes were able to set the basic parameters for the political debates of the moment.

In the broadest sense, Chilean political divisions were historically determined by two cross-cutting party-generative cleavages. The first was the clerical-anticlerical divide (reflecting originally the church-state conflict typical of a Catholic country with an established church), and the second was created by class divisions both urban and rural. The first cleavage separated the parties closer to the Church, such as the Conservatives and later on the Christian Democrats, from those that sought to limit its influence over the state and society, such as —most typically— the

<sup>4</sup> All abbreviations in this paper follow the Spanish acronyms.

<sup>5</sup> Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 131-216, in which Sartori himself uses Chile as an example for his discussion of extreme polarization.

Radicals and most segments of the left. The class cleavage positioned the Chilean parties, as elsewhere, on what has become identified as the right to left scale. The salience of the clerical versus anti-clerical conflict diminished in the decades after the separation of Church and state in 1925, especially after the rise of the Cold War which led to the breakup of the center-left alliance of the forties. Consequently, most political conflicts over the past decades revolved around issues cast in terms of right versus left positions. This does not mean that the prior division disappeared; it continued to be an important element in creating different political sub-cultures and sensibilities. It explains, for instance, the division between Radicals and Christian Democrats, two parties that have usually sought a centrist position in their approach to issues reflecting a left to right dimension.

The polarization of the party system increased in the late sixties as the Socialist Party formally adopted Marxist-Leninist positions (although the party continued to be characterized by a collection of quite diverse tendencies), and as the right consolidated into the PN vowing to take a hardline position against the Christian Democratic government of President Eduardo Frei Montalva and its agrarian reform program. The Socialists, Communists, and the main group of the Radical party united to form what was called the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, UP) coalition in 1969 to contest the 1970 presidential election, and succeeded in winning it with Salvador Allende as the candidate. He was opposed at that point by Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the right, and by Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of the Christian Democratic Party. The 1970 election was unusual in that it captioned in a presidential race the division of the electorate into its right-center-left segments; presidential elections since the thirties have rarely produced this effect either because there are more than three candidates, because one segment's electorate generally opts to support its second-choice to prevent what it considers a worse outcome, and/or because each tendency has not presented strong candidates. The slightly greater support for the left than for the center in 1970 can be attributed to the shift towards an alliance with the left by the centrist radicals: hence, Allende won 36.2% of the vote, Alessandri won 34.9%, and Tomic 27.8%.<sup>6</sup> Subsequently, The Christian Democrats and the rightist Nationals made a pact called Confederación Democrática (Democratic Confederation, CODE) to counter the Popular Unity coalition. With this pact, the Christian Democrats and Nationals presented a single candidate against the left in

<sup>6</sup> See Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), table 11.

congressional by-elections, and agreed to add their votes in the parliamentary elections of 1973.

Over the course of the military government, the complexion of the party system changed considerably. Unwilling to have anything to do with parties, the military junta that took power suspended all party activities and banned the parties of the left.<sup>7</sup> Eventually, however, to prepare for a projected re-initiation of electoral activities, the government approved a new law governing party life, and at the beginning of 1987 the parties that met certain stipulations —mainly collecting a specified number of signatures— could register legally as such. There were significant incentives for parties to register legally, since doing so permitted them to present candidates for office and to name representatives to all polling stations; this latter attribute was an important advantage given the fact that General Pinochet was constitutionally bound to hold a plebiscite in 1988 on whether or not he would continue as head of state for another eight years. Consequently, over the next three years Chilean political leaders took the initiative to register their parties following the law's procedures.

The rightist National party was the only one that willingly accepted the suspension of all party activities imposed by the military junta, and perhaps for this reason it almost disappeared as an organization with its usual label as a consequence of the authoritarian experience. Two new party organizations and labels emerged as its successors to appeal to the electorate of the right: National Renewal (Renovación Nacional, RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI). The first is the main successor of the National Party, judging from the fact that most of its remaining politicians and militants were drawn into it —although it also has an important group of younger leaders, including its president. The party tries to present a center-right image, and includes figures that were somewhat critical of the military government although the party did support it. It also identifies generally with the teachings of the Catholic Church. The UDI includes a larger number of new political leaders in its ranks, many of whom held prominent positions in the military government. It is closer to the right side of the political spectrum, and it identifies readily with the policies and programs put into place by the authoritarian regime. Having emerged with a blend of neo-liberalism and strongly conservative Catholicism, its founding figure, the late Senator Jaime Guzmán, was a member of the Opus Dei. Both parties of the right

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<sup>7</sup> This prohibition was eventually extended to the Christian Democrats as well in 1978.

rapidly took the necessary measures to register following the legal procedures established by the Pinochet regime.

Among the forces opposed to the military government, one of the first to take advantage of the 1987 party law was a new group of political leaders who, with a very general statement of principles and a new label, Partido Humanista (Humanist Party, PH), collected over one hundred thousand signatures to register their party. They were soon followed by the Christian Democrats, who registered under their traditional party label, and by the Radicals. The parties of the left were initially reluctant to register, and given constitutional proscriptions of groups holding Marxist positions, the parties understood to have them (i.e., the Communists and some segments of the then very divided Socialist party) would probably not been allowed to register anyway. Moreover, the complex divisions in the Socialist party (which had, in addition to its own factions, absorbed the Christian left groups of various shades that emerged in the late sixties) made it difficult for any one segment to contemplate registering on its own with the Socialist label. Hence, leaders associated with the more moderate Socialist sectors decided to create what they viewed at the time as an “instrumental party,” the Party for Democracy (Partido Por la Democracia, PPD), through which they would register to take advantage of the party law’s provisions. Subsequently, after the strictures banning parties with Marxist principles were greatly weakened through a constitutional reform in July of 1989, a new “instrumental party” called Broad Party of the Socialist Left (Partido Amplio de Izquierda Socialista, PAIS) was created by other leaders in the Socialist party who hoped to widen the scope of leftist participation in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Through the PAIS label and its alliance for the 1989 parliamentary elections called Unity for Democracy (Unidad por la Democracia, UD), a number of leftist (including Communist) candidates were able to run in selected districts, while the PDC, PPD, PR and other smaller parties formed the backbone of the Concertation of Parties for Democracy (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, CPD), the main electoral pact of the forces opposed to the military regime. Eventually, the PPD took on a life of its own and became a real instead of an instrumental party, while PAIS disappeared and the Socialist (PS) and Communist Parties (PC) registered legally as well after the beginning of the new democratically elected government. The PPD and the PS shared many militants who were members of both parties, but in mid-1992 they decided to force their members to opt for one or the other. This has reinforced the independent identity of the PPD, which tries to project a modern image; it has become the main center-left party whose

roots can be traced back to the Unidad Popular coalition, and it occupies a political space formerly held largely by the now quite diminished Radical Party.

A new entry in the Chilean party configuration is the Partido de Centro Centro (Party of the Center-Center, PCC). It emerged around the leadership of Francisco Javier Errázuriz, a businessman who became a populist candidate for the Presidency in 1989 with generally rightist views. It registered as a party and presented candidates in the 1992 municipal elections with considerable success, winning 8.5% of the vote, more than either the Communist or the Radical parties.

The party system that emerged from the authoritarian experience is quite different from that of the past. Firstly, the current party leaders, with the exception of the Communists and some minority Socialist sectors on the left and to some extent the UDI on the right, now try to emphasize the centrist nature of their positions and programs. Renovación Nacional insists repeatedly that it is a “center-right” party, and the Unión de Centro Centro puts this notion in its very label. The change is especially striking among a majority of the Socialists. Whereas in the late sixties and early seventies the predominant group in the party was influenced by the Cuban revolution and espoused positions generally considered to be to the left of the Communists, most —and in the case of the PPD virtually all —are now close to the current outlook and policies of the Spanish Socialists.<sup>8</sup> As a result of these changes, the party system —at least during the years of the democratic transition— no longer has the same sharp ideological distance between the main parties as was the case before the breakdown, and it therefore no longer fits so easily within Sartori’s polarized pluralism type.<sup>9</sup> There is currently a considerable consensus over fundamental issues pertaining to the nation’s socio-economic institutions, and voters are not asked to choose between radically different models of development.

Secondly, the party alliances during the democratic transition years are very different from what they were in the late sixties and early seventies. Whereas in the late sixties the Christian Democrats and the parties of the left as well as the Radicals were at loggerheads and in the early seventies the Christian Democrats made an alliance with the right, President Aylwin’s

<sup>8</sup> The reason for this shift within the Socialist party have been discussed amply elsewhere. Suffice it to say that it is partly a consequence of the experiences Socialist leaders and militants had in both Eastern and Western Europe during their years of exile. See Ignacio Walker, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988) and Julio Faúndez, *Socialismo y Democracia en Chile: Chile y Europa en Perspectiva Comparada* (Santiago: CIEPLAN-Hatchette, 1990).

<sup>9</sup> Sartori, loc. cit.

governing coalition, called the Concertation of Parties for Democracy (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, CPD), is composed of the Christian Democrats and the parties that were formerly part of the UP—except for the Communists. Two decades ago the coalitional patterns were determined mainly by support or opposition to the left-wing government of President Allende, while more recently they have been determined by party acceptance or rejection of the military regime. After the initial vacillation of a narrow majority in the Christian Democratic party towards the military coup, it soon found common ground with the parties that formerly supported the Allende government in opposing military rule and in demanding a rapid transition to democracy. This change in the coalitional pattern is a highly significant one in the Chilean party system. By introducing a new dimension of party divisions along the lines of support or rejection of the military government, it has undoubtedly submerged the traditional sources of conflict between the parties, contributing to the above noted decrease in the party system's polarization. The current Chilean party system has been recreated in a manner that is reminiscent of the late thirties to late forties, when there was also a center to left alliance, in contrast to that of the early seventies. The principal differences between the current and the older coalitions are that the Christian Democrats and not the Radicals are now the main center party, and that the Communist party, whose vote is half to a third of what it was then, does not formally belong to the present coalition.

A fundamental question for the proximate future is whether the parties of the Concertation can remain united by forging agreements over programs and political leaders that go beyond those created for the transition to democracy. As the dominant issue when the Concertation was created recedes —i. e., the necessity of defeating Pinochet in the plebiscite and winning the presidency for the forces pressing for a rapid and full program of democratization— the cleavage between supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime will have less and less strength in creating and maintaining party alignments. In this new situation, the political leaderships within the Concertation will be tempted to try to strengthen their own parties and political identities around issues other than a rejection of the dictatorship, and may, for this reason, welcome electoral competition in order to do so. It remains to be seen whether this competition manages to revolve around such specific issues that the fundamental consensus over basic questions can be retained, thereby avoiding the reemergence of the centripetal tendencies in the party system and permitting the recreation of the Concertation for a full post-Aylwin presidential period.

### **Continuities in Electoral Support for the Right, Center, and Left Tendencies**

The municipal elections of the end of June 1992 were the first to be held since 1971. Like the 1971 elections, seats were allotted according to a proportional vote similar to the previous one (a modified d'Hondt system) with candidacies representing the full range of the party spectrum, including the Communists. Although the government parties and the two main right wing opposition ones made pacts and even subpacts in order to maximize the number of municipal councillors they could elect, voters had to choose between the candidates presented by the specific party lists. They could not, however, vote for the list as a whole as they could before 1973, but had to choose a specific name within the list. Despite this latter feature that personalized the voters' choices and the inevitable importance of local issues and personalities in municipal contests, the 1992 elections permit an approximate assessment of the current relative electoral strength of the parties. Table 1 shows these results by right, center, and left tendency following not the 1992 alliances but as *these were constituted in 1970*. The table also recalls the vote in the 1970 presidential election, the average vote received by the parties of the right, center, and left in congressional elections for the lower house between 1937 and 1973, and presents additional 1992 vote totals for purposes of comparison with the prior results as will be explained below.

The first and foremost conclusion that must be drawn from table 1 is that the 1992 vote totals by tendency are remarkably similar to those of prior years. The right's vote at 29.9% is virtually the same as it was on average between 1937 and 1973, and only marginally below the total received by Jorge Alessandri in the 1970 presidential race. Given the fact that the Union of the Center's top leader and former presidential candidate was generally supportive of the military government, and —as noted below— that his vote correlates, albeit weakly, in the same direction as that of the right in general, it could be argued that the UCC vote should be added to the right's total. In this case the right has 38%, or about 3% more than the percentage obtained by Alessandri. However, it is not clear that the UCC's vote is indeed fully a rightist one. The UCC also has a populist streak to it, and its name may induce many voters who would not otherwise support the rightist parties to vote for it. Moreover, its candidate list (as occurs with hastily organized parties) drew a large number of names from local leaders who were, or normally would have, identified with other parties, including those of the Concertation, but who found no place in the

TABLE N° 1: CONTINUITIES OF ELECTORAL RESULTS IN CHILE, 1937-1992\*

1992 Parties Grouped as in 1970 Alliances**	1992 Vote by Party list	Total 1992 Vote by 1970 Alliances	1970 Presidential vote	Average 1937 to 1973 Congressional Vote***
Right:				
R.N.	13.4			
U.D.I.	10.2			
Independents	6.0			
P.L.	.2			
P.N.	.1			
TOTAL RIGHT		29.9	34.9	30.1
RIGHT+U.C.C.	38.0			
Center:				
P.D.C.	28.9			
Independents	.5			
TOTAL CENTER		29.4	27.8	
CENTER+P.R.+A.H.-V.+S.D.	36.3			
Left:				
P.P.D.	9.2			
P.S.	8.5			
P.R.	4.9			
S.D.	.4			
Independents	.0			
TOTAL LEFT (EX UP)		29.6	36.2	
P.P.D.+P.S.+P.C.	24.3			24.2
Other:				
U.C.C.	8.1			
Independents	2.1			
A.H.-V.	.8			
TOTAL OTHER		11.0	-	
TOTAL REGISTERED 1992 VOTERS				7,840,008
TOTAL 1992 VOTES CAST				7,028,616
TOTAL 1992 BLANK VOTES CAST			410,982	
TOTAL 1992 NULL VOTES				215,423

\* In percentages rounded to the nearest decimal.

\*\* Party abbreviations: R.N.= Renovación Nacional; U.D.I.= Unión Demócrata Independiente; U.C.C.= Unión de Centro Centro; P.L.= Partido Liberal; P.N.= Partido Nacional; P.D.C.= Partido Demócrata Cristiano; A.H.-V.= Alianza Humanista-Verde; S.D.= Socialdemocracia Chilena; P.P.D.= Partido Por la Democracia; P.S.= Partido Socialista de Chile; P.C.= Partido Comunista de Chile; P.R.= Partido Radical de Chile; U.P.= Unidad Popular.

Except for the independents in the "other" category, they are identifiable by tendency according to the pact they subscribed with other parties, as noted in the electoral results.

\* \* \* Average votes in Lower House elections. The election years 1949, 1953, and 1957 are not considered for the average Socialist and Communist vote given the legal proscription of the Communist candidates.

Sources: Ministry of the Interior figures for 1992 vote; and Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), Tables 2 and 11.

other party lists. Hence, we have opted to keep the UCC in the “other” category in table 1, together with the independents who were not part of party pacts and with the Humanist Party’s alliance with the Greens, even though the first row in italics shows the total right plus UCC vote.

Turning to the center, table 1 shows that the Christian Democratic vote in 1992, at 28.9%, is virtually the same as that which Radomiro Tomic received as a presidential candidate for the party twenty two years earlier. It is also virtually equal to the 29.8% the party received in the 1969 congressional elections, and the 29.1% that it received in the same elections in 1973.<sup>10</sup> Adding the 1992 votes of the Christian Democrats, the Radical party, the Humanist-Green Alliance, the Social Democrats, and the independents (all of which formed part of the same sub-pact within the broader pact of the pro-government forces) generates a proportion of the vote that is about three and a half percent shy of that received by the center forces, on average, in the lower house races between 1937 and 1973, namely, 36.3% versus 39.7% respectively. It is very likely that the centrist part of the UCC vote would compensate for this deficit were its voters to be forced to choose between the more clearly defined right, center, and left parties.

The 1992 vote for the left is somewhat smaller (29.6%) than that received by Salvador Allende as a presidential candidate in 1970 (36.2%). Since the 1992 Socialist vote (adding the PPD and PS) is a bit higher than it was in the mid to late 1960s, the decline is primarily due to lower Radical and Communist votes when compared to their levels of the end of that decade.<sup>11</sup> The Radical party has suffered the consequences of its various splits since the late 1960’s, and the lower Communist vote is the Chilean manifestation of a worldwide trend away from the party in those countries where it was an important political actor. And yet, the PPD, the PS, and the PC all obtain virtually the same vote total (24.3%) as did the Socialists and Communists together on average (24.2%) between 1937 and 1973 (exclusive of the three election years —1949, 1953, 1957— during which the Communists were legally banned). The left tendency, as composed exclusively by its Socialist and Communist kernel, has always been the weaker one of the three tendencies in Chile. In this sense, the 1992 vote represents a return to the historic pattern rather than to the peak of electoral

<sup>10</sup> A. Valenzuela, 1978, table 10.

<sup>11</sup> In the 1965 congressional elections the Socialists garnered 10.7%, the Communists 11.4% and the Radicals 13.3% of the vote. In those of 1969, the percentages were 12.2, 15.9, and 13 respectively. The Socialists and Communists obtained their highest vote in 1973 with 18.7% and 16.2% respectively, point at which the Radicals declined to a mere 3.7%. See A. Valenzuela, 1978, table 10.

support the Socialists and Communists received in the late sixties and especially the early seventies.

These notable continuities in electoral support for the various tendencies occur despite the fact that the numbers of voters have increased dramatically (both through the enfranchisement of women in 1949 and with the compulsory vote introduced in 1962) since 1937. Moreover, they occur even though more than half of the current electoral registry is composed of people who had never voted before. The size of the electorate in 1973 was about 4.5 million and in 1992 it had grown, as shown in table 1, to 7.8 million. This almost doubling of the number of registered voters occurs despite the fact that about a quarter of the original voters must have passed away in the intervening two decades, given an overall mortality rate of about 15 per thousand. The large number of new voters, the greater complexity of the 1992 choices and ballots —the ones in 1988 plebiscite and 1989 elections were simpler —and the lesser importance of municipal in contrast to national races perhaps explain why the number of void and null votes were, at 8.9% of the total votes cast, a relatively large proportion.<sup>12</sup>

The continuities in electoral support are also noteworthy in that they occur despite the fact that the party alliances —and the party system— are different from what they were before. This means that the Chilean party leaderships can count on having a relatively constant basic level of electoral support regardless of the alliances they make, although *only as long as the electorate of the tendency to which they belong views them and their party as the proper political expression of that tendency*. If this is not the case, then another party, either a new or a pre-existing one, has a good chance of benefiting from the electoral support of that sector of opinion. For this reason, new party organizations and labels may well emerge, as was the case recently in the right with RN and UDI, and in the center-left with PPD, despite the remarkable continuities in electoral support for the various political tendencies or subcultures. This means that Chilean political leaders cannot take the size of their party's vote entirely for granted despite the remarkable continuities in electoral support per tendency. Although there is undoubtedly a certain percentage of voters in Chile who are loyal to the party label and who will automatically vote for it, and there is a certain inertia of party organization, identity, and national presence in key elected positions that help to retain the party labels (for which major changes in party labels are more likely during periods of interruption of normal political life as under the Pinochet dictatorship), the primary electoral

<sup>12</sup> Following the usual practice in Chile, Table 1 omits the void and null votes when calculating the percentages received by the various parties.

attachments are more to the tendency to which the party belongs than to the party. This also means that new parties can create spaces for themselves in the party spectrum by orchestrating their electoral appeals as more properly representative of the political sentiments and traditions of a certain tendency or sub-tendency—as occurred three and one half decades ago with the emergence of the Christian Democrats. This requires not so much a “correct” formulation of specific policies and programs—although these matter, especially to the more centrist voters—as the ability to focus attention on key values, symbols, and links to social organizations (be they churches, unions, or others) that are associated to specific tendencies as well as sub-colorations within them.

### **Consistencies in Voting Patterns: Evidence from Correlational Analysis**

The simple correlations of the vote by commune between the plebiscite of 1988, the presidential elections of 1970 and 1989, and the congressional elections of 1969, 1973 and 1989, also show the remarkable consistency in electoral choices in Chile. We prefer to use the term “consistency” rather than “continuity” at this point because the correlations between the PDC vote in the late sixties and early seventies and the PDC vote in the late eighties are negative. This result is to be expected, and reflects a form of continuity rather than discontinuity. It is the consequence of the fact that the profile (or distribution of voting strength by commune) of the PDC vote in the late sixties and early seventies was closer to the right than to the left; in other words, the PDC vote was both more evenly spread accross the country than the vote for the left, and it tended to be relatively stronger in areas where the right was also stronger. Hence, the simple correlation of the Christian Democratic and rightist vote in the 1970 presidential elections was a positive .31, while it was a negative .64 with the left.<sup>13</sup> This was the case even though at that time the PDC leadership was drawn from the left segments of the party and its presidential candidate in 1970 preferred to make alliances with the left. In 1971 the PDC leadership changed and opted to enter a formal electoral alliance with the right, running with it in the 1973 congressional elections. In the wake of the authoritarian experience the PDC entered a coalition with the left which

<sup>13</sup> A. Valenzuela, 1978, p. 41. Pearson correlation indices vary between -1 and +1, with positive ones showing direct associations between the variables (such that high

made the electorates of both segments vote in tandem, first for the “no” in the plebiscite of 1988, and then for a single presidential candidate and for a common list of parliamentary candidates. The combination of the votes by both segments of different profiles in the more recent elections leads, as expected, to the negative correlations between the PDC votes of both periods, and this is evidence of electoral consistency. The strongest positive correlates are between the left and the right votes of the late sixties and early seventies with their respective options in the 1988 plebiscite and in the 1989 presidential and parliamentary elections, as we shall see in the following pages. We will begin by examining the consistency of voting patterns in the recent elections.

#### From the 1988 Plebiscite to the 1989 Presidential and Congressional Elections

The correlations of the 1988 “yes” and “no” vote in the plebiscite on whether General Pinochet should continue in power are highly consistent with the subsequent support for presidential and parliamentary candidates.

Table 2 contains the correlations with the presidential vote, which had two other candidates in addition to Aylwin. These were Hernán Büchi, the former minister of finance under the Pinochet government who was supported by the parties of the right, and the above mentioned Francisco Javier Errázuriz. The correlations between the “yes” and “no” and the Aylwin and the Büchi votes are very solid and in the expected direction. It is clear that the “yes” for the continuation of the Pinochet government came basically from right wing constituencies and that the “no” came from center to left electorates. The positive correlation between the “yes” and the Errázuriz vote shows that he most probably drew his support primarily from the right, weakening the Büchi vote more than that of Aylwin.

TABLE 2: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS OF THE 1988 PLEBISCITE AND 1989 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE, BY COMMUNE\*

	Yes	No
Aylwin	-.8830	.8972
Büchi	.7778	-.7884
Errázuriz	.2999	-.2991

\*All correlations are significant at the .001 level. N= 249.

Source: This and all subsequent tables were elaborated on the basis of electoral data drawn from the Dirección del Registro Electoral.

Table 3 contains the relationship between the plebiscite and the 1989 parliamentary vote for the main party pacts.<sup>14</sup> We omit two lists (under letters D and E in the ballot) presented by fringe groups of the right that obtained each less than 3% of the vote and whose correlates are not particularly significant. Hence the table includes the Democracy and Progress (Democracia y Progreso) pact formed by the two main parties of the right, RN and UDI; the Concertation pact of the Aylwin coalition; and the Unity for Democracy pact organized by PAIS that permitted candidates of the Socialist left and of the Communist party to run in communes where they had the best chances of winning. The UD pact also supported Aylwin for the presidency, and in some of the communes where it fielded candidates the Concertation presented only one name, instead of the permissible two, in order to favor the election of specific candidates from the Unity list. The correlations in table 3, once again, show a great consistency between the votes in the plebiscite and the support for the main party pacts. And yet, the correlations between the “yes” and the “no” and the parliamentary elections are stronger for the right’s Democracy and Progress pact than for either the Concertation or the UD pacts. This drop is at least in part due to the effect of the split for the parliamentary vote of the “no” and pro-Aylwin electorate into two lists; although the UD pact only received 5.2% of the total vote, this support is sufficient to diminish somewhat the strength of the correlates.

Table 4 shows the relationship between the 1989 presidential vote and that for the three main parliamentary pacts of that year. As can readily be seen, these are also highly consistent results. The correlates between the right’s Democracy and Progress pact are again stronger than those of the

TABLE 3: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE 1988 PLEBISCITE AND THE 1989 PARLIAMENTARY VOTE FOR THE MAIN PARTY PACTS

	Yes	No
Concertation*	-.4950	.5018
Democracy and Progress*	.7039	-.7024
Unity for Democracy**	-.5184	.5632

\*N= 249; significant at the .001 level.

\*\*N= 72; significant at the .001 level.

values in one correspond to high values in the other) and negative ones showing inverse associations.

<sup>14</sup> For a general and informative discussion of the 1989 elections in Chile see Alan Angell and Benny Pollack, “The Chilean Elections of 1989 and the Politics of the Transition to Democracy,” in *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, vol. 9, 1 (1990), pp. 1-23.

Concertation or of the Unity for Democracy Pacts given the small split in the parliamentary vote among Aylwin supporters. The correlates of the Errázuriz vote show it, once again, to be basically a rightist one.

In addition to voting for a presidential candidate, voters in 1989 could select specific congressional candidates listed in the party pacts under their separate party affiliations. Hence, the 1989 elections also permit calculations of the correlates per party list, even if the pacts between the parties meant inevitably that they could not present candidates in all the nation's communes. Table 5 shows the correlations between the presidential vote and the specific party lists.

The strongest positive correlate in table 5 is that of PAIS with the candidacy of Patricio Aylwin, followed by that of the Christian Democratic list with Aylwin. The strongest negative correlates are those of RN with

TABLE 4: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE AND THE PARLIAMENTARY VOTE FOR THE MAIN PARTY PACTS IN THE 1989 ELECTIONS

	Aylwin	Büchi	Errázuriz
Concertation*	.5626	-.4836	-.2021
Democracy and Progress*	-.7757	.8486	.0449
Unity for Democracy**	.6144	-.4942	-.3299

\*N=258. Significant at the .001 level.

\*\*N=72. Significant at the .001 level.

TABLE 5: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTES RECEIVED BY PARTIES AND THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN THE 1989 ELECTIONS\*

	Aylwin	Büchi	Errázuriz
PDC (N=166)	.5034	-.3729	-.2602
PPD (N=100)**	.4123	-.4292	-.0325
PR (N=99)	.1314	-.1369	-.0379
RN (N=225)	-.4706	.3553	.2716
UDI (N=118)	-.1590	.2189	-.0944
PAIS (N=71)	.5849	-.4240	-.3942

\* All correlations are significant at the .001 level, except for those of the PR (.097, .088, and .355 in columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively) and UDI (.043, .009, and .155 in columns 1, 2, and 3 respectively).

\* \* The PPD row includes most Socialist Party candidates; some were listed under the PAIS label.

Aylwin, and of the PPD and of PAIS with Hernán Büchi. It is interesting to note that both the UDI and RN separately only correlate moderately with the Büchi vote, while in combination under the Democracy and Progress pact—as noted in table 4—they do so very strongly. This is particularly noteworthy when compared to the relatively smaller loss in correlational strength between the Concertation pact as a whole and its individual party components, as can be seen by comparing tables 4 and 5. The fact that there is such a significant difference between the two pacts in this respect probably has to do with the different procedures employed by the political leaders within the pacts to determine which party would present candidates in which commune. The Concertation could rely on past voting patterns to determine which group had the best chances to win in which communes, since its component parties had past electoral experiences to fall back on. By contrast, the UDI is a completely new party label, one born basically out of a group of supporters of the military government, the great majority of whom did not even have personal experience in electoral contests. The pact of the right could not rely, therefore, on past voting patterns to select which groups had the best claim to present candidates in specific districts, except to some extent with the more seasoned leaders of the old right who became members of RN. Consequently, the correlations of the party votes with the presidential candidate of the right are much weaker than that of the pact as a whole with that candidate, especially in the case of the UDI. Similarly, the negative correlations between the UDI and the Aylwin vote are also notably weak, while this is not the case with RN—showing the effect of the greater reliance on past voting patterns in the latter party's case for the selection of candidates.

Table 5 also shows that the Errázuriz vote is stronger in areas of strength of the right. This can be seen in its positive correlations with the RN, and in its negative correlations with PAIS and the PDC. The fact that the correlation with the UDI is flat shows, once again, that the selection of districts for its candidates did not follow a clear profile of rightist voting strength.

Correlates of the 1988 Plebiscite, the 1989 Presidential Vote, and the 1989 Congressional Vote with the 1970 Presidential Elections

The correlates of the elections in the late eighties with the last presidential election preceding the breakdown of democracy in 1973 are strong for the left, weaker and often in an apparently inverse direction for

the center, and generally strong for the right. As noted above, the fact that the center's correlates (primarily the PDC vote) are weak and often of the opposite sign with its current candidates and positions indicates a consistency in voting patterns given the changes in electoral alliances.

Table 6 shows the "yes" and "no" 1988 plebiscite's correlates with the 1970 presidential election. The pattern is very clear: areas of voting strength for the right's candidate, Jorge Alessandri, and for the left's candidate, Salvador Allende, are also those of strength for the "yes" and the "no" with the respective positive signs —and vice versa. The vote for the Christian Democratic candidate, Radomiro Tomic, correlates moderately in a positive direction with the "yes", and moderately as well but inversely with the "no." And yet, the most noteworthy result is that the aggregation of the Allende and the Tomic vote (which artificially creates, in effect, the Concertation alliance in the context of the 1970 election) is correlated in the same direction and with almost the same strength as the Allende vote taken separately (i.e., -.5282 for the Allende + Tomic vote and the "yes," and -.5760 for the Allende vote alone with the "yes"; .5147 for the Allende + Tomic vote and the "no," and .5797 for the Allende vote alone with the "no"). This artifact of the calculations is only possible, once again, given the consistencies in voting patterns. Although the PDC vote of 1970 correlates with the "yes" (.3540), it is a vote that has its own profile that can be, as a result, adapted to fit the current alliance and made to correlate in tandem with it. The Tomic vote correlates well and positively with the Christian Democratic vote of the 1969 and the 1973 congressional elections (.4795 and .5473 respectively), which shows the internal consistency of the PDC electorate in that time period. By the same token, as can be appreciated in the last row of table 6, the aggregation of the Tomic with the Alessandri vote strengthens the correlations in the same direction as the rightist vote.

TABLE 6: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS OF THE 1970 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE AND THE 1988 PLEBISCITE\*

	Yes	No
Alessandri	.5108	-.4964
Tomic	.3540	-.3792
Allende	-.5760	.5797
Tomic + Allende	-.5282	.5147
Tomic + Alessandri	.5562	-.5594

\* All correlates significant at the .001 level, with N=248.

The same patterns can be observed between the 1970 and the 1989 presidential elections, as can be appreciated in Table 7. In this case, again, the Alessandri and the Allende votes correlate individually both strongly and in the expected directions with the candidacies of the 1989 contest, showing as well that the Errázuriz vote's correlates are basically to the right of the spectrum. Similarly, the Tomic vote correlates negatively with his party's presidential candidate in 1989, and positively with the candidate of the right in that contest. The fact that this latter correlation, at .30, is virtually the same as the correlation between the Tomic and the Alessandri votes in 1970 (namely .31 as noted above<sup>15</sup>) is again evidence of the consistency of the Christian Democratic electorate. However, recreating the Concertation alliance by aggregating the Tomic and Allende votes produces a strong positive correlation with the Aylwin vote (one that is even stronger than the same 1970 vote with the "yes"), and a relatively strong negative correlation with the Büchi candidacy. Similarly, aggregating the Tomic vote with that of Alessandri strengthens the latter's correlations in the same direction.

Similar patterns, although with somewhat weaker correlates, can be observed when correlating the 1970 presidential votes with the 1989 election's congressional candidacies by pacts. The Alessandri vote correlates negatively with that of the Concertation, positively with the DP pact of the right, and negatively (and more strongly so) with the leftist UD, which shows the sharpest correlates of all. The Tomic vote correlates positively with the right's DP pact, and negatively with the Concertation and the left's UD agreement, although it does so moderately. The Allende vote correlates in the expected directions, although its correlation with the

TABLE 7: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS OF THE 1970 AND 1989 PRESIDENTIAL VOTES\*

	Aylwin	Büchi	Errázuriz
Alessandri	-.5923	.4407	.3959
Tomic	-.3694	.3013	.1930
Allende	.6412	-.5184	-.3581
Tomic+Allende	.6061	-.4881	-.3483
Tomic+Alessandri	-.6230	.4778	.3875

\* All correlates are significant at the .001 level. N=253.

<sup>15</sup> A. Valenzuela, loc. cit.

Concertation is moderated by the presence of the UD pact that saps some of the correlate's strength. Adding the Tomic and the Allende vote changes the signs of the Tomic correlations to what they should be given the present alliances, and adding the Tomic and Alessandri vote strengthens the correlates when compared to those in both the Alessandri and Tomic rows. All of this can be examined directly in table 8.

TABLE 8: SIMPLE CORRELATES OF THE 1970 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE WITH THE 1989 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS BY PACTS\*

	Concertation	Democracy and Progress	Unity for Democracy
Alessandri	-.3176	.4433	-.4914
Tomic	-.2788	.2995	-.2702
Allende	.3724	-.5067	.5553
Tomic +Allende	.3047	-.4734	.5195
Tomic + Alessandri	-.3774	.4786	-.5287

\* All correlates significant at the .001 level. N=253 in columns 1 and 2, and 73 in column 3.

#### Correlates of the 1989 Presidential with the 1973 and 1969 Congressional Elections

Similar patterns occur when correlating the presidential vote of 1989 with that of the major blocs in the congressional elections prior to the breakdown of democracy. Table 9 shows these correlations with the 1973 congressional elections.

Again, the 1973 vote for the right and the PDC is correlated positively with the Büchi and (though less strongly) with the Errázuriz votes, while they correlate negatively with the vote for Aylwin. However, adding the 1973 PDC vote with that of the left generates a strong positive correlation with the Aylwin vote. Similarly, adding the 1973 PDC vote with that of the right yields a stronger negative correlation than the original one between the right and Aylwin. The sharpest single correlate in the table, .6901, is that between the left's vote in 1973 and the Aylwin vote. As was the case in other results, this one shows that the traditionally leftist areas of voting strength were the most favorable to the candidate of the Concertation alliance in 1989.

TABLE 9: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS OF THE 1989 PRESIDENTIAL WITH THE 1973 CONGRESSIONAL VOTES\*

	Aylwin	Büchi	Errázuriz
Right	-.4827	.4222	.2172
PDC	-.3475	.3348	.1165
Left	.6901	-.5962	-.3120
PDC + Left	.5919	-.4858	-.2976
PDC + Right	-.5978	.5416	.2447

\* All correlates are significant at the .001 level. N=253.

Table 10 shows the correlates between the 1989 presidential vote and the congressional elections that took place twenty years earlier. It contains a similar pattern to that in table 9, except that the strength of the correlates with the 1969 vote is lower across the board, in some cases much lower. This is probably due to the fact that the political polarization had increased in the country by the 1973 parliamentary elections, and by raising the votes for the right and the left this sharpened the contrasts between areas of voting strength for these tendencies thereby increasing the value of the correlates. However, the correlation between the 1969 leftist vote and the 1989 Aylwin vote continues to be very solid. The negative correlation between the 1969 leftist vote and the Büchi vote is also strong, as is the positive one generated by adding the 1969 PDC and leftist vote and relating it to that of Aylwin.

TABLE 10: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE 1989 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE AND THE 1969 PARLIAMENTARY VOTE.\*

	Aylwin	Büchi	Errázuriz
Right	-.2784	.2753	.1490
PDC	-.1240	.0913	.1023
Left	.5726	-.4507	-.3057
Left + PDC	.4248	-.3384	-.2033
Right + PDC	-.2588	.2273	.1492

\* All correlates significant at the .001 level, except those of the PDC with Aylwin (.024) and with Büchi (.074). N=253.

### Correlates of the Congressional Elections of 1989 with those of 1973 and 1969

Given the party pacts formed for the 1989 elections, the various parties did not present candidates in all districts. Consequently, the correlations for the individual party votes can only be calculated on the basis of the number of communes where the parties ran their candidates. This probably diminishes the strength and decreases their margins of significance. Moreover, the parties called on voters in 1989 to support candidates of their coalitional partners in those districts where they did not present candidates, and this has the effect of blurring somewhat the political profile of the different communes, resulting in lower correlates or even in different ones from those that are to be expected. However, despite these drawbacks, we went ahead and calculated the correlations between the 1989 congressional elections and those of 1973 and 1969 by party pact and by party list. And as can be appreciated below, the results show strong correlates where these can be expected, with the significant exception of the UDI, to which reference has already been made above. Table 11 shows the correlates of the 1989 and the 1973 votes.

TABLE 11: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE 1989 AND THE 1973 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (LOWER HOUSE ONLY)

1989 Pacts & Parties*	1973				
	Right	PDC	Left	Left + PDC	Right + PDC
<b>D.P.</b>	<b>.3594</b>	<b>.3750</b>	<b>-.5678</b>	<b>-.4211</b>	<b>.5158</b>
RN	.3226	.0547	-.3218	-.3542	.2897
UDI	.0895	.1143	-.1746	-.1416	.1353
<b>Concert.</b>	<b>-.2044</b>	<b>-.3383</b>	<b>.4055</b>	<b>.2486</b>	<b>-.3693</b>
PDC	-.1302	-.1811	.2514	.1941	-.2027
PPD	-.2588	-.3771	.5012	.3772	-.4098
<b>U.D.</b>	<b>-.3204</b>	<b>-.2170</b>	<b>.4072</b>	<b>.3763</b>	<b>-.3660</b>

\* Notes on the rows:

D. P.= Democracy and Progress pact. Correlations significant at the .001 level. N = 253.

R. N. = National Renewal party. Correlations significant at the .001 level, except for the one in the PDC column. N = 221.

U.D.I. = Independent Democratic Union. N = 115.

Concert. = Concertation pact. All correlations significant are at the .001 level. N = 253.

P.D.C = Christian Democratic Party. N = 162.

P.P.D. = Party for Democracy. Except for the one with the right which is significant at the .005 level, all correlations significant at the .001 level. N=99.

U.D. = Unity for Democracy. The correlations in the left column is significant at the .001 level, and the two right ones are significant at the .001 level. N= 73.

In Table 11, the highest correlations are generally those that involve the left and secondarily the right when its 1989 referent is the Democracy and Progress pact. The latter's positive correlate with the addition of the 1973 PDC and rightist vote is strong at .5158, and its negative correlate with the 1973 left is an even stronger -.5678. The positive correlate of the Concertation pact with the left of 1973 is moderately strong at .4055, while that of the PPD (Socialists) is an even stronger .5012 with the left of 1973. The PPD is also negatively correlated quite strongly with the addition of the 1973 rightist and Christian Democratic vote, and with the Christian Democratic vote alone.

Table 11 is also interesting in its low correlates. The PDC has mainly mild associations with the past votes. The strongest is a positive .2514 with the vote of the left in 1973, while the relationship with the 1973 PDC vote has a negative sign. As we noted above, the association between the past Christian Democratic vote and the present one is affected by the PDC change of alliances from right then to left now. The most remarkable among the weak correlates is that of the UDI with the 1973 vote for the right, which is almost a flat .0895. As we also indicated above, this probably shows that the UDI, as a new party organization, did not rely on past voting patterns in its choices of districts in which to present candidates. It may also have received relatively high votes in areas where the right did not do well in the past, benefitting from the fact that the military government named many of its members to run the municipal governments of large cities, often in popular neighborhoods. By contrast, the correlates of RN are, although moderate, all in the expected directions. The Unity for Democracy pact also has correlates that run in the expected directions, although they are unexpectedly weaker than those of the PPD with the exception of the negative relationship with the 1973 rightist vote.

The associations with the 1969 congressional elections are similar to those of 1973, although they are generally weaker. Table 12 contains these results.

While a majority of the correlations are weaker in table 12 when compared with those in table 11 (although they are in the expected directions as in table 11), a good number are either stronger or the same. This is the case with the PPD's correlates, which are stronger in a negative direction with the right and in a positive direction with the sum of the 1969 PDC and left votes, while the correlate with the left of 1969 is virtually the same at a strong .5029. The correlations of the UD pact are also stronger with the left (.5362) and with the left + PDC 1969 votes, and almost the same, in a negative direction, with the PDC vote of 1969. The UDI's

TABLE 12: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE 1989 AND THE 1969 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (LOWER HOUSE ONLY)

1989 Pacts & Parties*	1969				
	Right	PDC	Left	Left + PDC	Right + PDC
<b>D.P.</b>	<b>.2821</b>	<b>.1397</b>	<b>-.4021</b>	<b>-.2641</b>	<b>.2558</b>
RN	.2139	.0283	-.3116	-.2407	.1522
UDI	.1636	.1075	-.2048	-.0841	.1516
<b>Concert.</b>	<b>-.1716</b>	<b>-.0482</b>	<b>.3167</b>	<b>.2482</b>	<b>-.1374</b>
PDC	-.0059	.0808	.1581	.2166	.0410
PPD	-.2928	-.1614	.5029	.4449	-.3095
<b>U.D.</b>	<b>-.2389</b>	<b>-.2242</b>	<b>.5362</b>	<b>.4109</b>	<b>-.2916</b>

\* Notes on the rows:

D. P. := Democracy and Progress pact. Correlations significant at the .001 level, except for the one with the PDC. N = 253.

R. N. = National Renewal party. Correlations significant at the .001 level, except for the ones in the PDC and in the right + PDC columns. N = 221 .

U.D.I. = Independent Democratic Union. N = 11 S.

Concert. = Concertation pact. Correlations with the left and the left + PDC significant at the .001 level. N = 253.

P.D.C = Christian Democratic Party. N = 162.

P.P.D. = Party for Democracy. Correlations with the left and with the left + PDC significant at the .001 level, and with the right + PDC at the .001 level. N=99.

U.D. = Unity for Democracy. The correlations with the left and with the left + PDC are significant at the .001 level. N=73

correlate with the 1969 right vote shows up with a weak .1636 while it was previously virtually flat, and its weak and inverse relationship with the left strengthens a bit to .2048.

This analysis of the correlates of individual parties with past elections can only be considered tentative and preliminary given the limitations imposed by the different electoral system that led to the formation of pacts. A more exact picture should emerge with the correlates of future electoral results with an electoral system that leads parties to place candidates in all the nation's districts. Whether the electoral system will be changed in the near future, thereby permitting this test, is still an open question.

## Conclusions

Through the analysis of the recent municipal elections and by correlating the votes in the elections of 1988 and 1989 with those of 1969, 1970 and 1973, this paper has shown that there are significant continuities

in electoral choices in Chile. These continuities occur primarily in the division of the electorate into tendencies —right, center, and left— rather than in specific party labels and organizations. There are three new important party labels in the country, two of them (RN and UDI) on the right, and one on the left (PPD). Of these new labels, the UDI is the one that represents the most significant change as its leadership is drawn primarily from individuals who began their careers in politics in association with the military regime, with no prior experience in electoral contests; hence its individual correlates with past elections are, as we have seen, much weaker than those of the other new party labels.

Despite these continuities, the Chilean party system has been altered by new patterns of alliances between the parties. These alliances reflect a new split among the parties between those who supported and those who opposed the military government. It is also a less polarized system given the new moderation of the Socialist groups, which are electorally the most important component of the left. Hence, the continuities in electoral choices mask profound changes in the political options open to the Chilean electorate. The Concertation coalition was forged in opposition to the authoritarian regime of General Pinochet, and includes as its main players the Christian Democratic as well as the Socialist (both the older PS and the newer PPD) and Radical parties. With time, as the authoritarian period recedes into the past, the division among parties between those who supported and those who opposed the military government will almost certainly have less strength as a basis to form party coalitions. A crucial test for the future of the reconfigured Chilean party system —and of Chilean politics and its stability— will come at that point. The question will be whether the older forms of political polarization will once again return when the task of the moment ceases to be the democratic transition, or whether the party divisions will remain moderate allowing the formation of new alliances between forces around the center of the ideological spectrum over programmatic and policy agreements. There is reason to be optimistic that this latter course will take effect, although only time can tell.

A paradoxical consequence of the great continuities in political divisions and options by tendency in the electorate is that the party leaderships —if they can draw on the appropriate political symbols to be seen as the heirs to a particular tendency— have a much greater degree of freedom to alter their patterns of alliances and to propose specific programs and policies than would otherwise be the case. The limit to this capacity of the party leaderships to innovate is given by the line at which the specific alliances and policies become broadly viewed as contradicting the

tendency's main identities, which involve basic values, defining symbols, and historical memories and attachments. The content and major emphasis in these identities may evolve slowly over time, and may even leave, as a result, some party leaderships out of tune with their electorate. For instance, a sharp anti-clerical (or anti-secular and anti-masonic) discourse would sound today completely outmoded even among those Chilean voters who are nonetheless identified with the same tendencies that formerly made such discourses a central part of their appeals. In a competitive political environment these contradictions will, sooner or later, be pointed out by alternative leaderships seeking to capture the voting block of their respective tendency. This success could always initiate a new change in party labels within the party system.

### Appendix

The data for the 1969, 1970, and 1973 elections are taken from the Dirección del Registro Electoral, Santiago, Chile, and were provided by Arturo Valenzuela. We wish to thank him.

The results of the 1988 Plebiscite are taken from unofficial results provided by the Comando Nacional por el No in a series of graphs published in *La Epoca*, October 7 (Regions 1, 2 and 3), 8 (Regions 4 and 5), 9 (the Metropolitan Region), 10 (Regions 6 and 7), 11 (Regions 8 and 9), and 12 (Regions 10, 11, and 12), 1988. The Comando was the only source that aggregated the 1988 Plebiscite results by commune. Unfortunately, the Ministry of the Interior and the Servicio Electoral only provided official results aggregated at the regional level. In any case, the figures given by the Comando Nacional coincide with the official results.

The results of the 1989 congressional and presidential elections are taken from the Servicio Electoral de Chile.

Since the analysis used throughout our study employs data aggregated at the communal level, we had to overcome an important obstacle in all our comparisons between pre- and post-Pinochet period elections. Redistricting during the Pinochet years changed the boundaries of the earlier communes, in some cases forming completely new voting districts at the commune level. To address this problem for our correlational analysis, we compared relatively detailed maps of the district boundaries pre- and post- redistricting. (The old communal maps were taken from Armand Mattelart, *Atlas social de las comunas de Chile*. Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1965. The current ones, which we photo-amplified to

correspond exactly to the same scale as in the Mattelart book, were taken from *La Epoca*, October 7-12, 1988.)

Where communal boundaries remained the same (or very nearly the same), no change was necessary. The following table represents cases where the boundaries were changed, matching pre-1973 communes with the closest corresponding communes after the 1980s redistricting:

Communes 1988 and After	Communes 1973 and Before
REGION OF TARAPACA	PROVINCE OF TARAPACA
-Putre	-Putre, Belén
-Camarones	-Codpa
-Huara, Camiña, Colchane	-Pisagua, Negreiros, Huara
-Pozo Almonte, Pica	-Pozo Almonte, Lagunas, Pica
REGION OF ANTOFAGASTA	PROVINCE OF ANTOFAGASTA
-María Elena	-Toco
-Ollagüe, Calama, San Pedro de Atacama	-Calama
-Tal-Tal	-Tal-Tal, Catalina
REGION OF ATACAMA	PROVINCE OF ATACAMA
-Chañaral, Diego Almagro	-Chañaral
-Caldera, Copiapó	-Caldera, Copiapó
-Vallenar, Alto del Carmen	-Vallenar
REGION OF COQUIMBO	PROVINCE OF COQUIMBO
-Vicuña, Paiguano	-Vicuña, Paiguano
-Rio Hurtado	-Samo Alto
-Ovalle, Punitaqui	-Ovalle, Punitaqui
REGION OF VALPARAISO	PROVINCE OF ACONCAGUA
-La Ligua	-La Ligua, Santa María
-Panquehue, Rinconada	-Panquehue
-Hijuelas, Calera	-Hijuelas, Calera
-Limache, Olmué	-Limache
METROPOLITAN REGION OF SANTIAGO	PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO
-Lo Barnechea, Las Condes, Vitacura	-Las Condes
-Pudahuel	-Barrancas, Renca
-Puente Alto, La Florida	-Puente Alto, La Florida
-Peñalolén, La Reina, Ñuñoa, Macul	-Ñuñoa
-La Pintana, San Ramón, La Granja	-La Granja
-El Bosque, La Cisterna	-La Cisterna
-Conchalí, Recoleta, Independencia, Renca, Cerro Navia, Quinta Normal, Lo Prado, Estación Central, Santiago, Cerrillos, Lo Espejo, P. A. Cerda, San Miguel, San Joaquín, Huechuraba	-Santiago, Conchalí, San Miguel, Quinta Normal

Communes 1988 and After	Communes 1973 and Before
REGION OF GENERAL O'HIGGINS -Graneros, Codegua	PROVINCE OF O'HIGGINS -Graneros
-Litueche, Pichilemu -Lolol, Chépica	PROVINCE OF COLCHAGUA -Rosario, Pichilemu -Lolol, Chépica
REGION OF MAULE -Sagrada Familia	PROVINCE OF TALCA -Valdivia de Lontué
-Cauquenes, Pelluhue	PROVINCE OF MAULE -Cauquenes
REGION OF BIO-BIO -Quirihue, Treguaco, Portezuelo -Pinto, Antuco, Tucapel	PROVINCE OF ÑUBLE -Quirihue, Portezuelo -Tucapel, Pinto, Quilleco
-Hualqui, San Rosendo, Yumbel , Cabreró	PROVINCE OF CONCEPCION -Hualqui, San Rosendo, Yumbel, Cabreró
-Contulmo, Tirúa	PROVINCE OF ARAUCO -Contulmo
-Quilleco, Santa Barbara	PROVINCE OF BIO-BIO -Quilleco, Santa Barbara
REGION OF LA ARAUCANIA -Pucón, Curarrehue -Nueva Imperial, Saavedra, Carahue, Teodore Schmidt -Freire, Cunco, Melipeucu, Vilcún	PROVINCE OF CAUTIN -Pucón -Nueva Imperial, Puerto Saavedra, Carahue -Freire, Cunco, Vilcún
REGION OF LOS LAGOS -Mariquina, Máfil -Los Lagos, Futrono	PROVINCE OF VALDIVIA -Mariquina -Los Lagos, Futrono
-San Juan de la Costa, Osorno, Entre Lagos	PROVINCE OF OSORNO -Osorno
-Río Negro, Purranque, Fresia -Cochamó, Hualaihué -Frutillar, Uanquihue, Puerto Varas	PROVINCE OF LLANQUIHUE -Río Negro, Purranque, Fresia -Cochamó -Puerto Varas, Frutillar
-Chaitén -Quellón, Mariquina -Quemchi -Puqueldón, Quinchao	PROVINCE OF CHILOE -Corcovado, Chaitén -Quellón -Quemchi, Achao -Puqueldón

Communes 1988 and After	Communes 1973 and Before
REGION OF AYSÉN -Cisnes, Lago Verde -O'Higgins, Tortel, Cochrane -Chile Chico	PROVINCE OF AYSÉN -Río Cisnes -Baker -General Carrera
REGION OF MAGALLANES AND THE CHILEAN ANTARCTICA -Torres del Paine, Laguna Blanca, San Gregorio, Río Verde, Natales  -Punta Arenas -Porvenir, Timaukel, Primavera, Navarino -Antártica**	PROVINCE OF MAGALLANES -Cerro Castillo, Morro Chico, -San Gregorio, Río Verde, Natales* -Magallanes -Porvenir, Bahía Inútil, Primavera, Navarino*

\*These communes had to be aggregated because the data for the 1973 and before electoral configuration exists only in the aggregated form.

\*\*This commune has no counterpart in the 1973 configuration because this area was not yet settled. ☐